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An Advantage for Survival Between Altruism and Envy with Strategic Interactions

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  • Sung-Hoon Park

Abstract

We examined the evolutionary stability of preferences (altruism and envy) in an evolutionary game that infinitely repeats a stage game. In the stage game, players who survived the previous game compete for survival in pairs. By solving the evolutionary game, we show that the survival advantage between altruism and envy depends on whether players’ efforts in the stage game are strategic complements or substitutes. With strategic complements, altruistic players have an advantage in survival. With strategic substitutes, envious players have advantages.

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  • Sung-Hoon Park, 2024. "An Advantage for Survival Between Altruism and Envy with Strategic Interactions," SAGE Open, , vol. 14(2), pages 21582440241, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:sagope:v:14:y:2024:i:2:p:21582440241259027
    DOI: 10.1177/21582440241259027
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    References listed on IDEAS

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