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The Influence of Asset Status on Income Equality Considering Digital Inclusive Finance and Equity Concentration: Evidence From China

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  • Jiaqi Sun
  • Ping Li
  • Jian Fang

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of asset status and external factors related to asset status on income distribution disparities among senior executives, employees, and shareholders. Incorporating micro-level data and theoretical analysis, the data of Chinese a-share listed companies from 2012 to 2021 are selected for panel regression analysis. Existing research has often focused on the main differences in income between employees and executives. This study reveals that the distribution of total corporate income among employees, executives, and shareholders can better reflect the fluctuating trend of income variance among different groups. It was found that asset efficiency, asset market value, and asset property rights, among other asset status factors, significantly influence the degree of inequality in income distribution. Empirical research results indicated that corporate executives can benefit similarly to shareholders from improvements in asset efficiency and other asset status factors. Following an increase in corporate cash holdings, executives tend to benefit more relative to employees. Additionally, digital inclusive finance and equity concentration both have moderating effects, mitigating the impact of asset status on inequality in income distribution.

Suggested Citation

  • Jiaqi Sun & Ping Li & Jian Fang, 2024. "The Influence of Asset Status on Income Equality Considering Digital Inclusive Finance and Equity Concentration: Evidence From China," SAGE Open, , vol. 14(1), pages 21582440241, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:sagope:v:14:y:2024:i:1:p:21582440241229569
    DOI: 10.1177/21582440241229569
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