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A Note on the Modeling of Rent Seeking

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  • Kurt von Seekamm Jr.

Abstract

Rent seeking has once again become an important topic in economics. However, rent seeking poses challenges that standard economic theory is not well equipped to handle. This paper develops a working definition of rent seeking that can be applied to post-Keynesian growth models. The main finding is that, in a post-Keynesian framework, rent seeking will have an effect on income distribution and average productivity. In addition, increases in rent seeking can have undesirable effects on the distribution of talent.

Suggested Citation

  • Kurt von Seekamm Jr., 2017. "A Note on the Modeling of Rent Seeking," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 49(4), pages 599-606, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:reorpe:v:49:y:2017:i:4:p:599-606
    DOI: 10.1177/0486613417717047
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    rent seeking; post-Keynesian economics; macroeconomics; human capital;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B5 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches
    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • E12 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Keynes; Keynesian; Post-Keynesian; Modern Monetary Theory
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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