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A Model Of The Informal Structure (Culture) Of Organizations

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  • Peter Abell

Abstract

Corporate culture is conceived of as a mixture of intra-organizational mechanisms which balance cooperative (helping) and competitive (rivalrous) relationships. A simple game whereby individuals compete for a series of `prizes' induces a level of relative deprivation which impacts negatively upon a helping game. Individuals, however, need help from others to compete effectively for the prizes.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Abell, 1996. "A Model Of The Informal Structure (Culture) Of Organizations," Rationality and Society, , vol. 8(4), pages 433-452, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:8:y:1996:i:4:p:433-452
    DOI: 10.1177/104346396008004005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John C. Harsanyi, 1992. "In Defense of Game Theory," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 51-61, January.
    2. Kreps, David M., 1990. "Game Theory and Economic Modelling," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198283812.
    3. Peter Abell, 1989. "Games in Networks," Rationality and Society, , vol. 1(2), pages 259-282, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Diane J. Reyniers, 1996. "Cooperation In Contests," Rationality and Society, , vol. 8(4), pages 413-432, November.

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    Keywords

    culture; help; organization; teams; trust;
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