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Political Control Of Implementation Agencies

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  • René Torenvlied

Abstract

This article describes a positive model of the implementation of policy decisions. The model combines the salience of implementation agencies for policy decisions with the extent to which these agencies are effectively controlled, in order to predict agency deviations from policy decisions. Special attention is paid to the effects of (a lack of) political consensus on the amount of agency deviations. Political consensus does not generally enhance compliance—as is often asserted—but does so conditional upon a low agency salience. This is shown both in a theoretical analysis and by an application of the model on the implementation of 17 policy decisions in a Dutch municipality.

Suggested Citation

  • René Torenvlied, 1996. "Political Control Of Implementation Agencies," Rationality and Society, , vol. 8(1), pages 25-56, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:8:y:1996:i:1:p:25-56
    DOI: 10.1177/104346396008001002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eskridge, William N, Jr & Ferejohn, John, 1992. "Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(1), pages 165-189, March.
    2. Peter J. May, 1993. "Mandate design and implementation: Enhancing implementation efforts and shaping regulatory styles," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(4), pages 634-663.
    3. Barry Weingast, 1984. "The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (with applications to the SEC)," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 147-191, January.
    4. Ferejohn, John A. & Weingast, Barry R., 1992. "A positive theory of statutory interpretation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 263-279, June.
    5. Ferejohn, John & Shipan, Charles, 1990. "Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(0), pages 1-20.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jelmer Schalk & René Torenvlied & Jeroen Weesie & Frans Stokman, 2007. "The Power of the Presidency in EU Council Decision-making," European Union Politics, , vol. 8(2), pages 229-250, June.
    2. René Torenvlied & Gina Velner, 1998. "Informal Networks and Resistance to Organizational Change: The Introduction of Quality Standards in a Transport Company," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 165-188, June.
    3. René Torenvlied & Robert Thomson, 2003. "Is Implementation Distinct from Political Bargaining?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 15(1), pages 64-84, February.

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