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The Choices Judges Make

Author

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  • Martin van Hees
  • Bernard Steunenberg

Abstract

In this paper we focus on the way in which courts affect public policy. We present a model of judicial behavior that combines insights from theories emphasizing the importance of policy preferences with those suggesting that courts are only motivated by formal-legal criteria. By embedding our model of judicial choice in a broader context of political decision-making we show how judges are able to affect policy and under what circumstances the judiciary will change their legal interpretations. The model is applied to decision-making by the Dutch Supreme Court on euthanasia to illustrate its main features.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin van Hees & Bernard Steunenberg, 2000. "The Choices Judges Make," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 12(3), pages 305-323, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:12:y:2000:i:3:p:305-323
    DOI: 10.1177/0951692800012003003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Steunenberg, Bernard, 1992. "Congress, Bureaucracy, and Regulatory Policy-Making," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(3), pages 673-694, October.
    2. Shepsle, Kenneth A., 1992. "Congress is a "They," not an "It": Legislative intent as oxymoron," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 239-256, June.
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    6. Eskridge, William N, Jr & Ferejohn, John, 1992. "Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(1), pages 165-189, March.
    7. Gely, Rafael & Spiller, Pablo T, 1990. "A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 263-300, Fall.
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    9. Gely, Rafael & Spiller, Pablo T., 1992. "The political economy of supreme court constitutional decisions: The case of Roosevelt's court-packing plan," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 45-67, March.
    10. repec:bla:kyklos:v:47:y:1994:i:4:p:551-71 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Steunenberg, Bernard, 1997. "Courts, Cabinet and Coalition Parties: The Politics of Euthanasia in a Parliamentary Setting," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(4), pages 551-571, October.
    12. Geoffrey Brennan & Hartmut Kliemt, 1994. "Finite Lives and Social Institutions," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(4), pages 551-571, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Höpner, Martin, 2010. "Warum betreibt der Europäische Gerichtshof Rechtsfortbildung? Die Politisierungshypothese," MPIfG Working Paper 10/2, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    2. Bernard Steunenberg, 2010. "Is big brother watching? Commission oversight of the national implementation of EU directives," European Union Politics, , vol. 11(3), pages 359-380, September.

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