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A Family Affair

Author

Listed:
  • Esther de Ruijter

    (Arbeid Opleidingen Consult, Westermarkt 4a, 5042 MC Tilburg, The Netherlands, e.de.ruijter@aoconsult.nl)

  • Tanja van der Lippe

    (ICS/Department of Sociology, Utrecht University, The Netherlands)

  • Werner Raub

    (ICS/Department of Sociology, Utrecht University, The Netherlands)

  • Jeroen Weesie

    (ICS/Department of Sociology, Utrecht University, The Netherlands)

Abstract

This study focuses on co-working by intimate partners and other family members in entrepreneurs' businesses. We hypothesize that co-working by family is beneficial because it reduces trust problems associated with employment relations. On the other hand, co-working is risky because co-working family members may lose income from, and their investments in, the business in the case of bankruptcy or, specific to co-working partners, in the case of separation. Using data from the survey Households in the Netherlands 1995 ( N = 137 entrepreneurs), we find that more trust problems, indicated by monitoring problems and one-sided dependence, indeed increase co-working by partners and family. Monitoring problems influence co-working by partners, while one-sided dependence influences co-working by family members. We also find that married partners are more likely to co-work than cohabiting partners. Bankruptcy risks are associated with the likelihood of co-working, although the direction of causality remains unclear for the effects of bankruptcy risks.

Suggested Citation

  • Esther de Ruijter & Tanja van der Lippe & Werner Raub & Jeroen Weesie, 2008. "A Family Affair," Rationality and Society, , vol. 20(2), pages 203-226, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:20:y:2008:i:2:p:203-226
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463108089545
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
    2. Pollak, Robert A, 1985. "A Transaction Cost Approach to Families and Households," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 23(2), pages 581-608, June.
    3. Esther de Ruijter & Tanja van der Lippe & Werner Raub, 2003. "Trust Problems in Household Outsourcing," Rationality and Society, , vol. 15(4), pages 473-507, November.
    4. Robert J. David & Shin‐Kap Han, 2004. "A systematic assessment of the empirical support for transaction cost economics," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(1), pages 39-58, January.
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