IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/ifwkwp/1388.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

How global rules are established and stabilized

Author

Listed:
  • Siebert, Horst

Abstract

This paper analyzes how international rules are established and stabilized, i.e. how an international institutional order develops. Rules emerge mainly through learning from negative experience and serve to reduce transaction costs. The paper looks at mechanisms that stabilize rule systems, at bargaining procedures for cooperation gains, dispute settlement, sanctions, side payments, self-enforcing contracts, waivers and regional integrations within a multilateral order. In addition it analyzes the prevention of negative spillovers, international courts and global public goods.

Suggested Citation

  • Siebert, Horst, 2007. "How global rules are established and stabilized," Kiel Working Papers 1388, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:1388
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/4103/1/kap1388.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 1999. "Same Song, Same Refrain? Economic Sanctions in the 1990's," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 403-408, May.
    2. Siebert, Horst, 2005. "TAFTA - a dead horse or an attractive open club?," Kiel Working Papers 1240, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    3. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(5), pages 416-416.
    4. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 2009. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd Edition (paper)," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 4129, January.
    5. Michael G. Plummer, 2007. "‘Best Practices’ in Regional Trading Agreements: An Application to Asia," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(12), pages 1771-1796, December.
    6. Barro, Robert J, 1986. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Rules versus Discretion," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 96(380a), pages 23-37, Supplemen.
    7. Stokke, Olav Schram, 2007. "A legal regime for the Arctic?: Interplay with the Law of the Sea Convention," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 402-408, July.
    8. Kemp, Murray C. & Wan, Henry Jr., 1976. "An elementary proposition concerning the formation of customs unions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 95-97, February.
    9. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Beckmann, Rainer & Hebler, Martin & Kösters, Wim & Neimke, Markus, 2000. "Theoretische Konzepte zum Europäischen Integrationsprozeß: Ein aktueller Überblick [Theoretical concepts for the process of European integration: A current overview]," MPRA Paper 35703, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Goodhart, Charles, 1989. "The Conduct of Monetary Policy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(396), pages 293-346, June.
    3. Peter J. Boettke & Liya Palagashvili, 2015. "Taming Leviathan," Supreme Court Economic Review, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(1), pages 279-303.
    4. Aurélien Goutsmedt, 2016. "The New Classical Explanation of the Stagflation: A Psychological Way of Thinking," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 16018, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    5. Fiorenza Venturini, 2018. "The Unintended Composition Effect of the Subnational Government Fiscal Rules: The Case of Italian Municipalities," Working papers 70, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.
    6. Low, Patrick, 2014. "Preferentialism in Trade Relations: Challenges for the World Trade Organization," ADBI Working Papers 478, Asian Development Bank Institute.
    7. Glazer Amihai & Konrad Kai A., 1994. "Intertemporal Commitment Problems and Voting on Redistributive Taxation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 278-291, November.
    8. Philippa Dee & Anne McNaughton, 2013. "Promoting Domestic Reforms through Regionalism," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Services Trade Reform Making Sense of It, chapter 14, pages 381-427, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    9. John Dove, 2012. "Credible commitments and constitutional constraints: state debt repudiation and default in nineteenth century America," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 66-93, March.
    10. Akbar E. Torbat, 2005. "Impacts of the US Trade and Financial Sanctions on Iran," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 407-434, March.
    11. Céline Grislain-Letrémy & Sabine Lemoyne de Forges, 2011. "Coordinating Flood Insurance and Collective Prevention Policies: A Fiscal Federalism Perspective," Working Papers 2011-07, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    12. Hilton L. Root, 1989. "Tying the King's Hands," Rationality and Society, , vol. 1(2), pages 240-258, October.
    13. Innwon Park & Soonchan Park, 2011. "Best practices for regional trade agreements," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 147(2), pages 249-268, June.
    14. Hans- Loef, 1989. "The case for rules in the conduct of monetary policy: A critique on a paper by B.T. McCallum," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 125(1), pages 168-178, March.
    15. Lance Davis & Stanley Engerman, 2003. "History Lessons: Sanctions - Neither War nor Peace," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(2), pages 187-197, Spring.
    16. Daniel Shoag & Cody Tuttle & Stan Veuger, 2019. "Rules Versus Home Rule—Local Government Responses to Negative Revenue Shocks," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 72(3), pages 543-574, September.
    17. Reinhard Neck, 1986. "Kann Stabilisierungspolitik unter Unsicherheit und Risiko "optimal" sein?," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 122(III), pages 509-534, September.
    18. Gene M. Grossman, 2016. "The Purpose of Trade Agreements," NBER Working Papers 22070, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Torvik, Ragnar & Mehlum, Halvor & Natvik, Gisle, 2021. "The Inefficient Combination: Competitive Markets, Free Entry, and Democracy," CEPR Discussion Papers 15727, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Kotlikoff, Laurence J, 1984. "Taxation and Savings: A Neoclassical Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 22(4), pages 1576-1629, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Transaction costs; Institutional competition; Gains from cooperation; Bargaining for cooperation gains; Positive mechanisms; International rules;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
    • P00 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - General - - - General
    • A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • N00 - Economic History - - General - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:1388. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iwkiede.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.