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The Effect of Structural Embeddedness on the Division of Household Labor: A Game-Theoretic Model Using a Network Approach

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  • Yoosik Youm
  • Edward O. Laumann

Abstract

Various economic and sociological approaches have attempted to solve the puzzle of persistent gender inequality in the division of housework, but with mixed results. We propose a game-theoretic model in which the structural embeddedness of the partners is the key contingency predicting family members' behavior. Under the condition of strong embeddedness, partners behave as if they share a unitary utility function because they can safely assume their partners' gain will be their own gain. Under the condition of weak embeddedness, however, partners can no longer assume a flow of future fair rewards and thus they are in a bargaining situation. They try to decrease their share of housework by using their resources (options outside marriage/cohabitation) as threats in their bargaining with their partners. A representative sample of Chicago from the Chicago Health and Social Life Survey is analyzed as illustrative evidence for the model.

Suggested Citation

  • Yoosik Youm & Edward O. Laumann, 2003. "The Effect of Structural Embeddedness on the Division of Household Labor: A Game-Theoretic Model Using a Network Approach," Rationality and Society, , vol. 15(2), pages 243-280, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:15:y:2003:i:2:p:243-280
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463103015002004
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    Cited by:

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    2. António Osório, 2019. "Gender differences in competition: gender equality and cost reduction policies," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 23(1), pages 27-52, June.
    3. YOUM Yoosik, 2011. "A Network Approach to the Economic Models of Fertility," Discussion papers 11062, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    4. Arnout van de Rijt & Vincent Buskens, 2006. "Trust in Intimate Relationships," Rationality and Society, , vol. 18(2), pages 123-156, May.
    5. Yoosik Youm & Byungkyu Lee, 2016. "A network approach to economic models of fertility," Rationality and Society, , vol. 28(4), pages 386-409, November.
    6. Osorio, António (António Miguel), 2019. "Gender differences in competition: gender equality and cost reduction policies," Working Papers 2072/351587, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.

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