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The Birth and Death of Taxes: A Hypothesis

Author

Listed:
  • Ames, Edward
  • Rapp, Richard T.

Abstract

Tax systems in England, France, Spain, and Venice are regarded as providing payments from subjects to governments for protection against foreign and domestic threats. In each developing state, the supply and demand for protection at the time of the tax system's origin determined the long-term character of taxation. Only where taxes arose in an environment of exceptionally long wars did subjects forfeit their right to control levies. Groups having close substitutes available for central government paid non-extortionate taxes. Collusion in the supply of protection led to noble tax privileges. Once created, taxes survived as long as the government itself.

Suggested Citation

  • Ames, Edward & Rapp, Richard T., 1977. "The Birth and Death of Taxes: A Hypothesis," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 37(1), pages 161-178, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jechis:v:37:y:1977:i:01:p:161-178_09
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    Cited by:

    1. Pietri, Antoine & Tazdaït, Tarik & Vahabi, Mehrdad, 2013. "Empire-building and Price Competition," MPRA Paper 63486, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Sep 2014.
    2. Karaman, Kamil KIvanç, 2009. "Decentralized coercion and self-restraint in provincial taxation: The Ottoman Empire, 15th-16th centuries," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 690-703, September.
    3. Yoram Barzel & Edgar Kiser, 2002. "Taxation and Voting Rights in Medieval England and France," Rationality and Society, , vol. 14(4), pages 473-507, November.
    4. de Juan, Alexander, 2015. "State Extraction and Anti-Colonial Rebellion – Quantitative Evidence from the Former German East Africa," GIGA Working Papers 271, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    5. Dae Jin Yi, 2012. "No taxation, no democracy? Taxation, income inequality, and democracy," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 15(2), pages 71-92.
    6. Hodgson, Geoffrey M. & Knudsen, Thorbjørn, 2008. "The emergence of property rights enforcement in early trade: A behavioral model without reputational effects," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 48-62, October.
    7. Leonor Freire Costa & Paulo Brito, 2018. "Why did people pay taxes? Fiscal innovation in Portugal and state making in times of political struggle (1500-1680)," Working Papers GHES - Office of Economic and Social History 2018/59, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, GHES - Social and Economic History Research Unit, Universidade de Lisboa.
    8. K. Kivanç Karaman & Sevket Pamuk, 2011. "Different Paths to the Modern State in Europe: The interaction between domestic political economy and interstate competition," LEQS – LSE 'Europe in Question' Discussion Paper Series 37, European Institute, LSE.
    9. Leonor Freire Costa, 2009. "Fiscal Innovations in Early Modern States: Which War did Really Matter in the Portuguese Case?," Working Papers GHES - Office of Economic and Social History 2009/40, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, GHES - Social and Economic History Research Unit, Universidade de Lisboa.
    10. Vahabi,Mehrdad, 2019. "The Political Economy of Predation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107591370, October.
    11. Mark Koyama, 2010. "The political economy of expulsion: the regulation of Jewish moneylending in medieval England," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 374-406, December.
    12. Tito Boeri & Jan van Ours, 2013. "The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets: Second Edition," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 10142.

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