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Trust And The Reliability Of Expectations

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  • Rolf Ziegler

Abstract

This paper discusses both `parametric trust situations' and `strategic trust situations' with expectation-based strategies and (limited) forecasting ability of the trustor, which is a way of modeling some basic ideas of `bounded rationality' from a rational-choice perspective. The analysis concentrates on one-shot, `non-embedded' situations. This is not to deny the importance of iteration and embeddedness. However, both for theoretical and practical reasons this `limiting' case deserves special attention. The analysis demonstrates how actors with less than perfect forecasting ability may be able to overcome the inherent dilemma of a trust relation. In the short run, an actor may decide to raise his forecasting ability by increased but costly attention, but in the medium run it can only be improved by learning processes.

Suggested Citation

  • Rolf Ziegler, 1998. "Trust And The Reliability Of Expectations," Rationality and Society, , vol. 10(4), pages 427-450, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:10:y:1998:i:4:p:427-450
    DOI: 10.1177/104346398010004003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ken Binmore, 1994. "Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 1: Playing Fair," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262023636, April.
    2. Werner, Raub & Keren, Gideon, 1993. "Hostages as a commitment device : A game-theoretic model and an empirical test of some scenarios," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 43-67, May.
    3. Heiner, Ronald Asher & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 1995. "Rational Cooperation In One-Shot Simultaneous Pd-Situations," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 95-03, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
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    1. repec:dgr:rugsom:02b32 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Kotsev Emil, 2022. "Knowing When and How to Trust Superiors’ Decisions: Toward a Conceptual Model of Subordinate Managers’ Behavior," Organizacija, Sciendo, vol. 55(1), pages 50-63, February.
    3. Bo Rothstein, 2000. "Trust, Social Dilemmas and Collective Memories," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 12(4), pages 477-501, October.
    4. Shaul M. Gabbay & Roger Th. A. J. Leenders, 2003. "Creating Trust through Narrative Strategy," Rationality and Society, , vol. 15(4), pages 509-539, November.
    5. Andreas Diekmann & Ben Jann & David Wyder, 2004. "Trust and Reputation in Internet Auctions," ETH Zurich Sociology Working Papers 1, ETH Zurich, Chair of Sociology, revised Oct 2007.
    6. Gabbay, Shaul M. & Leenders, Roger Th.A.J., 2002. "A perceptional view of the Coleman model of trust," Research Report 02B32, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
    7. Beckert, Jens, 2005. "Trust and the Performative Construction of Markets," MPIfG Discussion Paper 05/8, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.

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