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Wealth Neutral Grants for Public Education

Author

Listed:
  • Robert W. Gilmer

    (Institute for Energy Analysis Oak Ridge, Tennessee)

  • Daniel C. Morgan Jr.

    (University of Texas at Austin)

Abstract

This article assesses wealth neutral grants within the traditional framework of the fiscal federalism. Discussions of the concept of fiscal equality or District Power Equalization (DPE) have centered largley on local control, and have defined equity as a problem of the comparison of local jurisdictions. The individual resident and the state government lie on either side of the locality in terms of collective decision-making, yet the perspective of neither of these sides has been adequately considered in past studies. These grants can cause substantial redefinitions of revenue responsibilities among various levels of government; they do far less than is commonly assumed to provide horizontal equity; and they do not relieve problems of location bias. We find that none of these problems, either individually or collectively, constitute an indictment of these grants, but their careful consideration offers a more balanced view of DPE than any yet offered

Suggested Citation

  • Robert W. Gilmer & Daniel C. Morgan Jr., 1979. "Wealth Neutral Grants for Public Education," Public Finance Review, , vol. 7(3), pages 259-281, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:7:y:1979:i:3:p:259-281
    DOI: 10.1177/109114217900700301
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. McGuire, Martin, 1974. "Group Segregation and Optimal Jurisdictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(1), pages 112-132, Jan.-Feb..
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    3. Buchanan, James M. & Goetz, Charles J., 1972. "Efficiency limits of fiscal mobility: An assessment of the tiebout model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 25-43, April.
    4. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(5), pages 416-416.
    5. Feldstein, Martin S, 1975. "Wealth Neutrality and Local Choice in Public Education," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(1), pages 75-89, March.
    6. David F. Bradford & Wallace E. Oates, 1971. "The Analysis of Revenue Sharing in a New Approach to Collective Fiscal Decisions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 85(3), pages 416-439.
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    1. Hontinfinde, F. & Ferrando, R. & Levi, A.C., 1998. "A numerical study of the epitaxial growth of silver on silver (110)," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 248(3), pages 288-304.
    2. Issigoni, M.E. & Paraskevaidis, C.E., 2005. "A new roughening temperature," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 351(2), pages 269-272.
    3. Langie, G. & Nijmeijer, M.J.P. & Nikas, Y.J. & Indekeu, J.O., 1993. "Monte Carlo simulation study of the thicknesses of wetting layers in pure and impure (quenched random-field) environments," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 192(3), pages 391-409.
    4. Shochet, Ofer & Kassner, Klaus & Ben-Jacob, Eshel & Lipson, S.G. & Müller-Krumbhaar, Heiner, 1992. "Morphology transitions during non-equilibrium growth," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 181(1), pages 136-155.

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