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Enfranchising all subjected: A reconstruction and problematization

Author

Listed:
  • Robert E. Goodin

    (School of Philosophy, 2219Australian National University, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, Australia)

  • Gustaf Arrhenius

    (7632Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm, Sweden
    Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University, Sweden)

Abstract

There are two classic principles for deciding who should have a right to vote on the laws, the All Affected Principle and the All Subjected Principle. This article is devoted, firstly, to providing a sympathetic reconstruction of the All Subjected Principle, identifying the most credible account of what it is to be subject to the law. Secondly, it shows that that best account still suffers some serious difficulties, which might best be resolved by treating the All Subjected Principle as a subset of the All Affected Principle with which the All Subjected Principle must in any case be supplemented.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert E. Goodin & Gustaf Arrhenius, 2024. "Enfranchising all subjected: A reconstruction and problematization," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 23(2), pages 125-153, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pophec:v:23:y:2024:i:2:p:125-153
    DOI: 10.1177/1470594X241232023
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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