Cost-sharing Rules and Efficient Provisions of Public Goods
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DOI: 10.1177/2321022213501261
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References listed on IDEAS
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Keywords
Public good; efficient provision of a public good; cost-sharing rules; Nash equilibrium;All these keywords.
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