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Matching Kidneys with Priority in Kidney Exchange Programs

Author

Listed:
  • Wenhao Liu

    (Salesforce.com, Inc.
    Department of Surgery, School of Medicine, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, USA)

  • Marc L. Melcher

    (Department of Surgery, School of Medicine, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, USA)

Abstract

Kidney exchanges were developed to match kidney failure patients with willing but incompatible donors to other donor-patient pairs. Finding a match in a large candidate pool can be modeled as an integer program. However, these exchanges accumulate participants with characteristics that increase the difficulty of finding a match and, therefore, increase patients’ waiting time. Therefore, we sought to fine-tune the formulation of the integer program by more accurately assigning priorities to patients based on their difficulty of matching. We provide a detailed formulation of prioritized kidney exchange and propose a novel prioritization algorithm. Our approach takes advantage of the global knowledge of the donor-patient compatibility within a pool of pairs and calculates an iterative, paired match power (iPMP) to represent the donor-patient pairs’ abilities to match. Monte Carlo simulation shows that an algorithm using the iPMP reduces the waiting time more than using paired match power (PMP) for the difficult-to-match pairs with hazard ratios of 1.3480 and 1.1100, respectively. Thus, the iPMP may be a more accurate assessment of the difficulty of matching a pair in a pool than PMP is, and its use may improve matching algorithms being used to match donors and recipients.

Suggested Citation

  • Wenhao Liu & Marc L. Melcher, 2019. "Matching Kidneys with Priority in Kidney Exchange Programs," Medical Decision Making, , vol. 39(4), pages 336-346, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:medema:v:39:y:2019:i:4:p:336-346
    DOI: 10.1177/0272989X19849457
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. , & , E., 2014. "Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(3), September.
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