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Social Network Legitimacy and Property Right Loopholes: Evidences from an Infrastructural Water Project in Pakistan

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  • Habibullah Magsi

    (UMR SAD-APT, INRA AgroParisTech, Paris Cedex 05, France, & Sindh Agriculture University Tando Jam, Pakistan habib.magsi@agroparistech.fr)

  • André Torre

Abstract

Little attention has been devoted to the role of social networks and property rights in infrastructural projects. We use the Chotiari water reservoir project data from Pakistan, to explore the social network of actors on land use and property right violation, which create a dissimilar power distribution and significant land use conflicts. Results indicate that public officials with their alien stakeholders have pressurised the local population to displace, where institutional inconsistency towards justice has led them to mistrust and project opposition. In Pakistan, the non-existence of a national resettlement policy is germinating land use conflicts and human and property rights violations since five decades. Therefore, attention to such conflicts, their resolution and prevention are important for research and policy development.

Suggested Citation

  • Habibullah Magsi & André Torre, 2012. "Social Network Legitimacy and Property Right Loopholes: Evidences from an Infrastructural Water Project in Pakistan," Journal of Infrastructure Development, India Development Foundation, vol. 4(2), pages 59-76, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jouinf:v:4:y:2012:i:2:p:59-76
    DOI: 10.1177/0974930612465166
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Habibullah Magsi & Anwar Hussain & Muhammad Khalid Rashid & Muazzam Sabir, 2019. "Local Actors, Institutions and Land Governance in the Chotiari Water Reservoir, Pakistan," Journal of Infrastructure Development, India Development Foundation, vol. 11(1-2), pages 136-148, June.
    2. Sabir, Muazzam & Sultan, Muhammad Saqib & Magsi, Habibullah & Bashir, Muhammad Khalid, 2024. "Socioeconomic implications of infrastructure development: Exploring the impacts of water infrastructure through stakeholders’ perceptions," World Development Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 33(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Land use conflicts; social networks; property rights; dams; reservoirs; D74; L14; P26; H54;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures

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