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Nomenklatura Rule Under Democracy

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  • Mario Ferrero
  • Giorgio Brosio

Abstract

This paper attempts to explain the puzzling features of the Italian political system up to 1992 by means of an economic model of a democratic Nomenklatura, in which the normal operation of a democratic system is distorted by the self-perpetuation of a ruling elite - `Nomenklatura' - which co-opts members of the opposition into its ranks to secure re-election and maximize per capita rent from political office. Competition for the field is thus suppressed and competition within the field enhanced. The Nomenklatura regime arose as a response to a non-democratic opposition and could not survive the downfall of Communism in the early 1990s. Thus the model yields an explanation for the regime's collapse after 1992.

Suggested Citation

  • Mario Ferrero & Giorgio Brosio, 1997. "Nomenklatura Rule Under Democracy," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 9(4), pages 445-475, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:9:y:1997:i:4:p:445-475
    DOI: 10.1177/0951692897009004002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jackman, Robert W., 1987. "Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(2), pages 405-423, June.
    2. Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922, September.
    3. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    4. George Stigler, 1972. "Economic competition and political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 91-106, September.
    5. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    6. Wintrobe, Ronald, 1990. "The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 849-872, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ferrero, Mario, 2001. "Political exchange in mass party regimes and the transition from socialism," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 365-379, December.
    2. Paolo Martelli, 1998. "Is Nomenklatura Rule the Clue to the Riddle of Italian Politics?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 10(2), pages 237-244, April.
    3. Howitt, Peter & Wintrobe, Ronald, 1995. "The political economy of inaction," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 329-353, March.
    4. Ferrero, Mario, 1999. "A model of political enterprise," POLIS Working Papers 9, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.

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