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Tell me the truth? Dictatorship and the commitment to media freedom

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  • Greg Chih-Hsin Sheen
  • Hans H. Tung
  • Wen-Chin Wu

Abstract

The emerging political economy literature on dictatorial media politics rationalizes the cross-country variation in media freedom by dictators’ demand for truthful information. Since a dictator can always punish the media for their truth-telling ex post , concerns of being punished could induce self-censorship and undermine the dictator’s promise to media freedom. We study a formal model that brings the dictator’s commitment problem to the fore, and characterize situations in which the commitment problem is especially severe. Our analysis suggests that neglecting self-censorship would lead to underestimating the amount of missing information in autocracies as well as overestimating the autocrats’ level of tolerance for criticisms and authoritarian responsiveness. Based on the comparative statics, we contend that the variation in media outlets’ quality and penetration can be leveraged to recover missing information due to self-censorship.

Suggested Citation

  • Greg Chih-Hsin Sheen & Hans H. Tung & Wen-Chin Wu, 2024. "Tell me the truth? Dictatorship and the commitment to media freedom," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 36(1), pages 37-63, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:36:y:2024:i:1:p:37-63
    DOI: 10.1177/09516298231208419
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    References listed on IDEAS

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