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Skill, power and marginal contribution in committees

Author

Listed:
  • Ruth Ben-Yashar

    (Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University, Israel)

  • Shmuel Nitzan

    (Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University, Israel)

  • Tomoya Tajika

    (Department of Law and Economics, Hokusei Gakuen University, Japan)

Abstract

Power is an important basic concept in Political Science and Economics. Applying an extended version of the uncertain dichotomous choice model proposed, the objective of this paper is to clarify the relationship between two different types of power a voter may have: skill-dependent (s-d) power and marginal contribution (mc). It is then shown that, under the optimal committee decision rule, inequality in skills may result in higher inequality of the two types of power and that the distribution of the second type of power (mc) can be even more unequal than the distribution of the first type of s-d power. Using simulations, and assuming evenly spread skills, this possibility is proved to be robust. The significance of the finding is due to the effect of power on reward, whether it is defined in terms of status or in terms of monetary payment.

Suggested Citation

  • Ruth Ben-Yashar & Shmuel Nitzan & Tomoya Tajika, 2021. "Skill, power and marginal contribution in committees," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(2), pages 225-235, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:33:y:2021:i:2:p:225-235
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629820984849
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ben-Yashar, Ruth & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2019. "Skill, value and remuneration in committees," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 93-95.
    2. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2013. "Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 1067-1095, April.
    3. Lloyd Shapley & Bernard Grofman, 1984. "Optimizing group judgmental accuracy in the presence of interdependencies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 329-343, January.
    4. Nitzan, Shmuel & Paroush, Jacob, 1982. "Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 23(2), pages 289-297, June.
    5. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 1996. "Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(1), pages 34-45, March.
    6. Ruth Ben-Yashar & Igal Milchtaich, 2007. "First and second best voting rules in committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(3), pages 453-486, October.
    7. Young, H. P., 1988. "Condorcet's Theory of Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(4), pages 1231-1244, December.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Shmuel Nitzan & Tomoya Tajika, 2022. "Inequality of decision-makers’ power and marginal contribution," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 92(2), pages 275-292, March.
    2. Ruth Ben-Yashar, 2023. "An application of simple majority rule to a group with an even number of voters," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 83-95, January.

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