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Signature requirements for initiatives

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  • Tomoya Tajika

Abstract

Signature requirements serve as barriers to prevent citizens from overusing initiatives. This study investigates the properties of optimal signature requirements by proposing a model in which the initiative process is a game played among citizens, a campaigner, and a legislature. Under the optimal requirement, the campaigner succeeds in collecting the required signatures only when it creates welfare that exceeds the cost of holding a referendum for the final decision. I specify the condition that such an optimal requirement is achievable. In addition, I perform comparative statics analyses to investigate the validity of the differences in signature requirements among countries and petition types. The results reveal a high optimal requirement when citizens have low variance regarding their opinions or do not consider the campaigned issue important. Finally, I evaluate the suggested reforms in the real world, such as imposing an additional cost on the campaigner to initiate a petition and a ban on paid petitioners, and show that while the former reduces citizen welfare, the latter improves it.

Suggested Citation

  • Tomoya Tajika, 2018. "Signature requirements for initiatives," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 30(4), pages 451-476, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:30:y:2018:i:4:p:451-476
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629818791035
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Torun Dewan & John W Patty, 2018. "Editors’ Introduction to JTP issue 30.4," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 30(4), pages 385-387, October.

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