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On the design of citizens’ initiatives in a union of states

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  • Maaser, Nicola

Abstract

The paper studies the design of popular initiatives in unions of states. We analyze the effect of state-specific threshold requirements on the incentives of a rational campaign organizer who decides which constituencies to target. If the heterogeneity of preferences in a population increases with its size, degressively proportional thresholds satisfy the normative objective of ‘neutrality’ between individuals from different states. In contrast, thresholds which are linear in population size are ‘neutral’ if a priori no differences between states are acknowledged.

Suggested Citation

  • Maaser, Nicola, 2013. "On the design of citizens’ initiatives in a union of states," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(1), pages 36-39.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:1:p:36-39
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.035
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Helios Herrera & Andrea Mattozzi, 2010. "Quorum and Turnout in Referenda," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(4), pages 838-871, June.
    2. Luís Aguiar-Conraria & Pedro Magalhães, 2010. "Referendum design, quorum rules and turnout," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 63-81, July.
    3. David Stromberg, 2008. "How the Electoral College Influences Campaigns and Policy: The Probability of Being Florida," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 769-807, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tomoya Tajika, 2018. "Signature requirements for initiatives," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 30(4), pages 451-476, October.

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