A strategic theory of effective monitoring arrangements for international institutions
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DOI: 10.1177/0951629813511550
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2018. "Self-legitimation in the face of politicization: Why international organizations centralized public communication," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 519-546, December.
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Keywords
Compliance; enforcement; international institutions; monitoring; principal–agent models;All these keywords.
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