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Coordination dilemmas and the valuation of women in the U.S. Senate: Reconsidering the critical mass problem

Author

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  • Kristin Kanthak

    (University of Pittsburgh, USA, kanthak@pitt.edu)

  • George A. Krause

    (University of Pittsburgh, USA)

Abstract

We offer a model of colleague valuation to illuminate the coordination challenges women legislators face. Our model predicts that women members’ strategies depend upon whether they value women colleagues as much as men do, or instead value fellow women colleagues more highly. We test these predictions by analyzing leadership PAC campaign contributions U.S. Senators made to incumbent and challenger women during the 105 th —108 th Congresses. We find that women Senators value fellow incumbent women colleagues less highly than do men Senators, whereas they value women challengers more highly than do men. Attaining a critical mass of women in legislatures is thus not sufficient for creating a successful working environment, but instead creates a coordination problem that supplants the previous token minority problem.

Suggested Citation

  • Kristin Kanthak & George A. Krause, 2011. "Coordination dilemmas and the valuation of women in the U.S. Senate: Reconsidering the critical mass problem," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(2), pages 188-214, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:23:y:2011:i:2:p:188-214
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629811398688
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    References listed on IDEAS

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