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Incommensurability and Issue Voting

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  • John W. Patty

    (Harvard University, jwpatty@gmail.com)

Abstract

In this article, I examine several models of voter behavior that are consistent with recent work in political psychology (Fiske and Tetlock, 1997) concerning incommensurability and individuals’ reluctance to make decisions involving explicit trade-offs between competing ideals or principles. In so doing, I show that one ramification of such cognitive dissonance is policy convergence in multidimensional (i.e. multi-issue) electoral competition between two parties or candidates. Furthermore, the predicted policy outcome is a weighted median, which represents, on each issue, each voter’s preferences to the degree that he or she is likely to use that issue to choose between the candidates.

Suggested Citation

  • John W. Patty, 2007. "Incommensurability and Issue Voting," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 19(2), pages 115-131, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:19:y:2007:i:2:p:115-131
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629807074264
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Patty, John Wiggs, 2005. "Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 523-536, May.
    2. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    3. Duggan, John & Fey, Mark, 2005. "Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 490-522, May.
    4. Patty, John W, 2002. "Equivalence of Objectives in Two Candidate Elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 112(1-2), pages 151-166, July.
    5. Davis, Otto A. & Hinich, Melvin J. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1970. "An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(2), pages 426-448, June.
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