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Equivalence of Objectives in Two Candidate Elections

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  • Patty, John W

Abstract

This paper examines the incentives facing candidates in two candidate elections. In particular, we provide a set of sufficient conditions for the optimal strategies of vote maximizing, plurality maximizing, and probability of victory maximizing candidates to be identical. In addition, we examine and provide counterexamples to two oft-cited results due to Hinich (1977) and Ledyard (1984) regarding the equivalence of these objectives in large two candidate elections. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Patty, John W, 2002. "Equivalence of Objectives in Two Candidate Elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 112(1-2), pages 151-166, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:112:y:2002:i:1-2:p:151-66
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    Cited by:

    1. Alexander, Dan, 2021. "Uncontested incumbents and incumbent upsets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 163-185.
    2. Gaëtan Fournier & Amaury Francou, 2023. "Location games with references," Post-Print hal-04241721, HAL.
    3. Kamada, Yuichiro & Kojima, Fuhito, 2013. "The equivalence between costly and probabilistic voting models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 179-185.
    4. Fournier, Gaëtan & Francou, Amaury, 2023. "Location games with references," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 17-32.
    5. John W. Patty, 2007. "Incommensurability and Issue Voting," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 19(2), pages 115-131, April.
    6. McKelvey, Richard D. & Patty, John W., 2006. "A theory of voting in large elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 155-180, October.
    7. Patty, John Wiggs, 2005. "Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 523-536, May.

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