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The Strategic Struggle for Patronage

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  • Allyson Lucinda Benton

    (División de Estudios Políticos, CIDE, Carretera México-Toluca 3655, Colonia Lomas de Santa Fé, D.F. 01210, Mexico allyson.benton@cide.edu)

Abstract

Latin American parties have been regularly plagued by factional disputes. Such rivalries are puzzling given the traditional importance of state largesse for building support; in most countries patronage has kept politicians loyal and factionalism at bay. The article uses a game-theoretic model to examine intra-party politics and political careers. It argues that ensuring successful careers requires rising within parties and thus cultivating the support of party colleagues with patronage promises and policy appeals. In Latin America, however, where state resources dominate policy goods when building support, maximizing patronage requires politicians to build minimum-winning coalitions inside parties, leading to predictable patterns of factionalism. The model also shows how the effect of state largesse on factional disputes is moderated in some contexts, particularly where the relative strength of politicians is weak. Weak politicians prefer to cooperate, even if this means reduced private rewards.

Suggested Citation

  • Allyson Lucinda Benton, 2007. "The Strategic Struggle for Patronage," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 19(1), pages 55-82, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:19:y:2007:i:1:p:55-82
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629807071019
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    References listed on IDEAS

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