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Even More Reasons to Resist the Temptation of Power Indices in the EU

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  • Geoffrey Garrett
  • George Tsebelis

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  • Geoffrey Garrett & George Tsebelis, 2001. "Even More Reasons to Resist the Temptation of Power Indices in the EU," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 13(1), pages 99-105, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:13:y:2001:i:1:p:99-105
    DOI: 10.1177/0951692801013001005
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tsebelis, George & Garrett, Geoffrey, 1996. "Agenda setting power, power indices, and decision making in the European Union," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 345-361, September.
    2. Bernard Steunenberg & Dieter Schmidtchen & Christian Koboldt, 1999. "Strategic Power in the European Union," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(3), pages 339-366, July.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Napel, Stefan & Widgrén, Mika, 2017. "Power measurement as sensitivity analysis: a unified approach," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 345, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    2. Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 2015. "The measurement of a priori voting power," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 8, pages 117-139, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2010. "The Hoede–Bakker Index Modified to the Shapley–Shubik and Holler–Packel Indices," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 19(6), pages 543-569, November.
    4. Mika Widgrén, 2003. "Enlargements and the Principles of Designing EU - Decision-Making Procedures," CESifo Working Paper Series 903, CESifo.
    5. Kyungjin Yoo & Seth Blumsack, 2018. "Can capacity markets be designed by democracy?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 127-151, April.
    6. Mika Widgren, 2003. "Power in the Design of Constitutional Rules," European Economy Group Working Papers 23, European Economy Group.
    7. Leech, Dennis, 2003. "The Utility of the Voting Power Approach," Economic Research Papers 269562, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    8. Leech, Dennis, 2003. "The Utility of the Voting Power Approach," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 678, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    9. James M. Snyder Jr. & Michael M. Ting & Stephen Ansolabehere, 2005. "Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 981-1004, September.

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