Why Power Indices for Assessing European Union Decision-Making?
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DOI: 10.1177/0951692899011003003
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 2015. "The measurement of a priori voting power," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 8, pages 117-139, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Borkowski, Agnieszka, 2003. "Machtverteilung Im Ministerrat Nach Dem Vertrag Von Nizza Und Den Konventsvorschlagen In Einer Erweiterten Europaischen Union," IAMO Discussion Papers 14887, Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO).
- Beat Spirig & Rolf Weder, 2008. "To Wait or Not to Wait: Swiss EU-Membership as an Investment under Uncertainty," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 144(I), pages 85-114, March.
- Matteo Migheli, 2016. "Measuring Representativeness in Different Electoral Systems, Using Italian and Dutch Data," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 723-748, July.
- Borkowski, Agnieszka, 2003. "Machtverteilung im Ministerrat: nach dem Vertrag von Nizza und den Konventsvorschlägen in einer erweiterten Europäischen Union," IAMO Discussion Papers 54, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO).
- Jonathan R. Strand & Kenneth J. Retzl, 2016. "Did Recent Voice Reforms Improve Good Governance within the World Bank?," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 47(3), pages 415-445, May.
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Keywords
European Union; game theory; power indices;All these keywords.
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