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To Race or to Place?

Author

Listed:
  • Jeremy T. Schwartz

    (Hampden-Sydney College)

  • Justin P. Isaacs

    (Hampden-Sydney College)

  • Anthony M. Carilli

    (Hampden-Sydney College)

Abstract

The authors use race-level data from 2003 and 2004 to test von Allmen's hypothesis regarding the inefficiency of the NASCAR reward system, where compensation is in the form of points that are accumulated throughout a season. They define drivers as two types, skilled and unskilled. Skilled drivers are hypothesized to be less aggressive than unskilled drivers because they are more productive given the same effort. Accordingly, an unskilled driver must be more aggressive than a skilled one to gain more compensation. The authors test this assertion empirically by modeling accidents as a proxy for aggression. They find that drivers who demonstrate skill in earlier races are less likely to get into accidents in subsequent races, suggesting there is a skill-level difference among drivers.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeremy T. Schwartz & Justin P. Isaacs & Anthony M. Carilli, 2007. "To Race or to Place?," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 8(6), pages 633-641, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jospec:v:8:y:2007:i:6:p:633-641
    DOI: 10.1177/1527002506294944
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Craig A. Depken II & Dennis P. Wilson, 2004. "The Efficiency of the NASCAR Reward System," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 5(4), pages 371-386, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Brad Humphreys & Bernd Frick, 2019. "Prize Structure and Performance: Evidence from NASCAR," Economies, MDPI, vol. 7(4), pages 1-13, October.
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    3. Dennis Coates & Petr Parshakov, 2016. "Team Vs. Individual Tournaments: Evidence From Prize Structure In Esports," HSE Working papers WP BRP 138/EC/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    4. Peter A. Groothuis & Jana D. Groothuis & Kurt W. Rotthoff, 2011. "Time on Camera," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 12(5), pages 561-570, October.
    5. David M. Yaskewich, 2017. "Heterogeneous Ability and Risk Taking in a Rank-Order Tournament," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 18(8), pages 803-830, December.
    6. Brad R. Humphreys & Jane E. Ruseski, 2010. "Problems With Data on the Sport Industry," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 11(1), pages 60-76, February.
    7. Craig A. Depken II & Matthew Hood & Ernest King, 2017. "Consistency and Momentum in NASCAR," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 18(6), pages 601-621, August.
    8. Shenkman, Evgenia & Coates, Dennis & Chadov, Aleksei & Parshakov, Petr, 2022. "Team vs. individual tournament: An organizer's dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 198(C), pages 476-492.
    9. Jason P. Berkowitz & Craig A. Depken II & Dennis P. Wilson, 2011. "When Going in Circles is Going Backward: Outcome Uncertainty in NASCAR," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 12(3), pages 253-283, June.

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