IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jocore/v67y2023i10p1904-1929.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Sanctions-Busting, Material Power, and Institutional Support for Economic Sanctions

Author

Listed:
  • Jin Mun Jeong

Abstract

International institutions play a key role in sanctions success. However, little is known about when senders mobilize institutional sanctions and how they induce international institutions to support their sanctioning efforts. Senders may need institutional support when they expect third-party states to engage in sanctions-busting. I suggest that senders anticipate sanctions-busting when they face third-party rivals which also have an alliance tie with targets. The presence of such potential sanctions busters may lead senders to seek institutional support. Also, senders should possess substantial material power to induce member states of international institutions to approve the sanctioning efforts. I assess the theoretical claim of this research by analyzing 1,038 sanctions episodes over the period 1951–2005. The findings support my argument that senders pursue institutional support when they face potential sanctions busters, and the success of their efforts partly depend on their material power.

Suggested Citation

  • Jin Mun Jeong, 2023. "Sanctions-Busting, Material Power, and Institutional Support for Economic Sanctions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 67(10), pages 1904-1929, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:67:y:2023:i:10:p:1904-1929
    DOI: 10.1177/00220027231154450
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00220027231154450
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/00220027231154450?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dreher, Axel & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Vreeland, James Raymond, 2009. "Development aid and international politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 1-18, January.
    2. John R. Oneal & Bruce Russett, 1999. "Is the liberal peace just an artifact of cold war interests? Assessing recent critiques," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(3), pages 213-241, March.
    3. Nielson, Daniel L. & Tierney, Michael J., 2003. "Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(2), pages 241-276, April.
    4. Vreeland,James Raymond & Dreher,Axel, 2014. "The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521740067, September.
    5. Leeds, Brett Ashley, 2003. "Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(4), pages 801-827, October.
    6. Ilyana Kuziemko & Eric Werker, 2006. "How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(5), pages 905-930, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Axel Dreher & Valentin F. Lang & B. Peter Rosendorff & James Raymond Vreeland, 2018. "Buying Votes and International Organizations: The Dirty Work-Hypothesis," CESifo Working Paper Series 7329, CESifo.
    2. Axel Dreher & Katharina Michaelowa, 2008. "The political economy of international organizations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 331-334, December.
    3. Lauren L. Ferry & Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Christina J. Schneider, 2020. "Catch me if you care: International development organizations and national corruption," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 767-792, October.
    4. Erasmus Kersting & Christopher Kilby, 2021. "Do domestic politics shape U.S. influence in the World Bank?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 29-58, January.
    5. Kersting, Erasmus K. & Kilby, Christopher, 2016. "With a little help from my friends: Global electioneering and World Bank lending," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 153-165.
    6. Vera Z. Eichenauer & Simon Hug, 2018. "The politics of special purpose trust funds," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 211-255, July.
    7. Axel Dreher & Vera Eichenauer & Kai Gehring & Vera Z. Eichenauer, 2013. "Geopolitics, Aid and Growth," CESifo Working Paper Series 4299, CESifo.
    8. Axel Dreher & Valentin F. Lang & Sebastian Ziaja, 2017. "Foreign Aid in Areas of Limited Statehood," CESifo Working Paper Series 6340, CESifo.
    9. Rommel, Tobias & Schaudt, Paul, 2020. "First impressions: How leader changes affect bilateral aid," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    10. Strand, Jonathan R. & Zappile, Tina M., 2015. "Always Vote for Principle, Though You May Vote Alone: Explaining United States Political Support for Multilateral Development Loans," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 224-239.
    11. Erasmus Kersting & Christopher Kilby, 2019. "The rise of supplemental lending at the World Bank," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 52(4), pages 1655-1698, November.
    12. Dreher, Axel & Lang, Valentin F. & Richert, Katharina, 2019. "The political economy of International Finance Corporation lending," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 242-254.
    13. Dreher, Axel & Fuchs, Andreas & Parks, Bradley & Strange, Austin M. & Tierney, Michael J., 2016. "Apples and Dragon Fruits: The Determinants of Aid and Other Forms of State Financing from China to Africa," Working Papers 0620, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    14. Axel Dreher & Vera Z Eichenauer & Kai Gehring, 2018. "Geopolitics, Aid, and Growth: The Impact of UN Security Council Membership on the Effectiveness of Aid," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 32(2), pages 268-286.
    15. Tierney, Michael J. & Nielson, Daniel L. & Hawkins, Darren G. & Roberts, J. Timmons & Findley, Michael G. & Powers, Ryan M. & Parks, Bradley & Wilson, Sven E. & Hicks, Robert L., 2011. "More Dollars than Sense: Refining Our Knowledge of Development Finance Using AidData," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(11), pages 1891-1906.
    16. Liya Palagashvili & Claudia R. Williamson, 2021. "Grading foreign aid agencies: Best practices across traditional and emerging donors," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 654-676, May.
    17. Dreher, Axel & Nunnenkamp, Peter & Thiel, Susann & Thiele, Rainer, 2010. "Aid allocation by German NGOs: Does the degree of public refinancing matter?," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 92, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    18. Juergen Bitzer & Erkan Goeren, 2018. "Foreign Aid and Subnational Development: A Grid Cell Analysis," Working Papers V-407-18, University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2018.
    19. Breßlein, Martin & Schmaljohann, Maya, 2013. "Surrender your market! Do the G5 countries use World Bank Trade Conditionality to promote Trade?," Working Papers 0550, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    20. Axel Michaelowa & Katharina Michaelowa, 2011. "Climate business for poverty reduction? The role of the World Bank," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 259-286, September.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:67:y:2023:i:10:p:1904-1929. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://pss.la.psu.edu/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.