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Why Do Autocrats Disclose? Economic Transparency and Inter-elite Politics in the Shadow of Mass Unrest

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  • James R. Hollyer
  • B. Peter Rosendorff
  • James Raymond Vreeland

Abstract

Autocratic governments hold a preference for opacity. Autocracies are less transparent than democracies and a closed informational environment preserves autocratic regimes from mass unrest. Yet, autocracies vary widely in the extent to which they disclose economic information. In this article, we offer an explanation for why some autocrats choose to disclose. We contend that, paradoxically, some autocratic leaders may benefit from increasing the capacity of the populace to mobilize. In so doing, autocratic leaders threaten rival members of the elite, reducing the risk of elite challenges and increasing their freedom of maneuver. We contend that transparency acts as one mechanism toward these ends. We formalize these intuitions and demonstrate empirically that leaders in transparent autocracies enjoy a reduced hazard of removal via coup relative to their opaque counterparts. Personalistic dictators and entrenched autocrats—who suffer the smallest risk of sanctioning by their elites—are particularly unlikely to disclose information.

Suggested Citation

  • James R. Hollyer & B. Peter Rosendorff & James Raymond Vreeland, 2019. "Why Do Autocrats Disclose? Economic Transparency and Inter-elite Politics in the Shadow of Mass Unrest," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 63(6), pages 1488-1516, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:63:y:2019:i:6:p:1488-1516
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002718792602
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gandhi,Jennifer, 2008. "Political Institutions under Dictatorship," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521897952, January.
    2. Milan W. Svolik, 2013. "Contracting on Violence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 57(5), pages 765-794, October.
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    4. Egorov, Georgy & Guriev, Sergei & Sonin, Konstantin, 2009. "Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 103(4), pages 645-668, November.
    5. Sergei Guriev & Daniel Treisman, 2015. "How Modern Dictators Survive: An Informational Theory of the New Authoritarianism," NBER Working Papers 21136, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mario Gilli & Yuan Li, 2021. "Selectorate’s information and dictator’s accountability," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(5), pages 524-542, September.
    2. Yuan Li & Mario Gilli, 2024. "Multidimensional policies, asymmetric public perception and stability in autocracies," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 36(3), pages 237-255, July.
    3. Ben Cormier, 2023. "Chinese or western finance? Transparency, official credit flows, and the international political economy of development," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 297-328, April.
    4. Cormier, Benjamin, 2023. "Chinese or western finance? Transparency, official credit flows, and the international political economy of development," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 115294, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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