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Bargaining Power at Europe's Intergovernmental Conferences: Testing Institutional and Intergovernmental Theories

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  • Slapin, Jonathan B.

Abstract

This article examines how European Union member states make choices about political institutions at intergovernmental conferences, the grand negotiations where many key institutional changes are made. Using data on member-state preferences from the intergovernmental conference leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam, I test competing bargaining theories, institutionalism, and intergovernmentalism, and present strong evidence that institutionalism better captures negotiations compared to intergovernmentalism. I present a formal model to discern between these competing theories of bargaining power, derive a statistical model directly from this formal model, and then use data from the European Union's Treaty of Amsterdam to test these theories and corresponding power sources. Veto power associated with institutional models better explains intergovernmental conference outcomes compared to power from size and economic might, often associated with intergovernmental analyses.I would like to thank Kathy Bawn, Julia Gray, Tim Groseclose, James Honaker, Joe Jupille, Thomas König, Jeff Lewis, Sven-Oliver Proksch, George Tsebelis, and the participants in UCLA's graduate student formal theory and statistical methods workshops for their insightful comments on various drafts of this article. I am also grateful for the comments from several anonymous reviewers and the editors at International Organization. An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 2006. Data and replication material are available at 〈http://faculty.unlv.edu/jslapin〉.

Suggested Citation

  • Slapin, Jonathan B., 2008. "Bargaining Power at Europe's Intergovernmental Conferences: Testing Institutional and Intergovernmental Theories," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(1), pages 131-162, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:62:y:2008:i:01:p:131-162_08
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    Cited by:

    1. Jonathan B Slapin, 2014. "Measurement, model testing, and legislative influence in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 15(1), pages 24-42, March.
    2. Christophe Crombez & Pieterjan Vangerven, 2014. "Procedural models of European Union politics: Contributions and suggestions for improvement," European Union Politics, , vol. 15(2), pages 289-308, June.
    3. Thomas Sommerer & Theresa Squatrito & Jonas Tallberg & Magnus Lundgren, 2022. "Decision-making in international organizations: institutional design and performance," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 815-845, October.
    4. José Luis Castro-Montero & Edwin Alblas & Arthur Dyevre & Nicolas Lampach, 2018. "The Court of Justice and treaty revision: A case of strategic leniency?," European Union Politics, , vol. 19(4), pages 570-596, December.
    5. Diana Panke, 2017. "Speech is silver, silence is golden? Examining state activity in international negotiations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 121-146, March.
    6. Christina J. Schneider & Johannes Urpelainen, 2014. "Partisan Heterogeneity and International Cooperation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 58(1), pages 120-142, February.
    7. Thomas Malang & Katharina Holzinger, 2020. "The political economy of differentiated integration: The case of common agricultural policy," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 741-766, July.
    8. Jonathan B. Slapin, 2009. "Exit, Voice, and Cooperation: Bargaining Power in International Organizations and Federal Systems," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 21(2), pages 187-211, April.
    9. Diana Panke, 2020. "Regional cooperation through the lenses of states: Why do states nurture regional integration?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 475-504, April.
    10. Fabio Franchino, 2013. "Challenges to liberal intergovernmentalism," European Union Politics, , vol. 14(2), pages 324-337, June.
    11. Martijn Mos, 2014. "Of Gay Rights and Christmas Ornaments: The Political History of Sexual Orientation Non-discrimination in the Treaty of Amsterdam," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(3), pages 632-649, May.
    12. Sommerer, Thomas & Squatrito, Theresa & Tallberg, Jonas & Lundgren, Magnus, 2021. "Decision-making in international organizations: institutional design and performance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 111834, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    13. von Malmborg, Fredrik, 2022. "Theorising member state lobbying on European Union policy on energy efficiency," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).
    14. Daniel F. Schulz & Thomas Henökl, 2020. "New Alliances in Post-Brexit Europe: Does the New Hanseatic League Revive Nordic Political Cooperation?," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 8(4), pages 409-419.
    15. Andreas H Hvidsten & Jon Hovi, 2015. "Why no twin-track Europe? Unity, discontent, and differentiation in European integration," European Union Politics, , vol. 16(1), pages 3-22, March.
    16. Daniel F. Schulz & Thomas Henökl, 2020. "New Alliances in Post-Brexit Europe: Does the New Hanseatic League Revive Nordic Political Cooperation?," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 8(4), pages 78-88.

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