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Mobilizing Bias in Europe

Author

Listed:
  • Scott L. Greer

    (University of Michigan, USA, slgreer@umich.edu)

  • Elize Massard da Fonseca

    (University of Edinburgh, UK, e.m.fonseca@sms.ed.ac.uk)

  • Christopher Adolph

    (University of Washington, Seattle, USA, cadolph@u.washington.edu)

Abstract

What effects do interest groups have on the democratization and legitimacy of the European Union (EU)? Interest groups can democratize the EU only to the extent that they do not replicate inequalities. We use a newly constructed database to look for inequalities: Are the big organizations in Brussels the same as the ones in the EU member states? Are some member states' lobbies more active than others? And does the structure of EU lobbying create insiders and outsiders itself? We find representative biases in favor of powerful incumbents, groups from some member states and wellresourced groups.

Suggested Citation

  • Scott L. Greer & Elize Massard da Fonseca & Christopher Adolph, 2008. "Mobilizing Bias in Europe," European Union Politics, , vol. 9(3), pages 403-433, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:9:y:2008:i:3:p:403-433
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116508093491
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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