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Analysis of a Strategic Terror Organization

Author

Listed:
  • Jonathan S. Feinstein

    (Yale School of Management, New Haven, CT, jonathan.feinstein@yale.edu)

  • Edward H. Kaplan

    (Yale School of Management, New Haven, CT)

Abstract

The authors model a terrorist organization’s choice over the scale and planning horizon of terror attacks and the consequences for the organization’s evolution. The organization can engage in short-term attacks planned and executed in a single period, characterized by a low fixed cost and relatively high marginal cost, and longer term attacks planned and executed over two periods, having a high fixed cost but relatively low marginal cost. Longer term attacks require more resources and cause more damage if successful. Successful attacks increase the organization’s size; in addition, the organization has a natural growth rate. Attacks can fail because of failed execution or counterterror interdiction. In a two-period version of this model, the authors analyze the terror organization’s attack decisions. They use simulations to characterize optimal strategies and explore their implications for the growth of the organization. The authors identify a set of strategic regimes, and the results show that they always occur in a fixed order as a function of the organization’s initial strength.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan S. Feinstein & Edward H. Kaplan, 2010. "Analysis of a Strategic Terror Organization," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(2), pages 281-302, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:54:y:2010:i:2:p:281-302
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002709355438
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Keohane, Nathaniel O & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 2003. "The Ecology of Terror Defense," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 26(2-3), pages 201-229, March-May.
    2. Joao Ricardo Faria & Daniel Arce, 2005. "Terror Support And Recruitment," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(4), pages 263-273.
    3. B. Peter Rosendorff & Todd Sandler, 2004. "Too Much of a Good Thing?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(5), pages 657-671, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jetter, Michael, 2017. "The effect of media attention on terrorism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 32-48.
    2. Hendel, Ulrich, 2012. ""Look like the innocent flower, but be the serpent under't": Mimicking behaviour of growth-oriented terrorist organizations," Discussion Papers in Economics 13998, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    3. Ulrich Hendel, 2016. "‘Look like the innocent flower, but be the serpent under’t’: mimicking behaviour of growth-oriented terrorist organizations," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(5), pages 665-687, September.
    4. McBride, Michael & Hewitt, David, 2013. "The enemy you can’t see: An investigation of the disruption of dark networks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 32-50.
    5. S. Blomberg & Khusrav Gaibulloev & Todd Sandler, 2011. "Terrorist group survival: ideology, tactics, and base of operations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 149(3), pages 441-463, December.
    6. Stefan Wrzaczek & Edward H. Kaplan & Jonathan P. Caulkins & Andrea Seidl & Gustav Feichtinger, 2017. "Differential Terror Queue Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 578-593, December.
    7. Kaplan, Edward H., 2013. "Staffing models for covert counterterrorism agencies," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 2-8.
    8. Kjell Hausken, 2020. "Governmental combat of migration between competing terrorist organisations," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 30(3), pages 21-46.
    9. Jonathan Feinstein & Edward Kaplan, 2011. "Counterterror intelligence operations and terror attacks," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 149(3), pages 281-295, December.
    10. Hausken, Kjell, 2019. "Governmental combat of the dynamics of multiple competing terrorist organizations," Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (MATCOM), Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 33-55.

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