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The Escalation of Terror: Hate and the Demise of Terrorist Organizations

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  • Catherine C. Langlois
  • Jean-Pierre P. Langlois

Abstract

Our goal in this article is to examine the strategic interaction between terror groups, hosts, and the United States in order to better understand the parameters of the interaction and the elements of a winning strategy. We adopt a game theoretic approach assuming that each player has a well defined goal and accounts for the anticipated behavior of the others to develop strategy. The game that we develop is a repeated game in which the host and the US must decide whether to fight a terrorist organization whose membership and resources will grow indefinitely if left unchecked. Our model predicts circumstances in which a host will begin to push back against the terrorists in anticipation of a future involvement of the US. It also predicts circumstances in which the terrorist organization’s hatred of the US prompts attacks that seal its fate and early demise.

Suggested Citation

  • Catherine C. Langlois & Jean-Pierre P. Langlois, 2011. "The Escalation of Terror: Hate and the Demise of Terrorist Organizations," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 28(5), pages 497-521, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:28:y:2011:i:5:p:497-521
    DOI: 10.1177/0738894211418423
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jun Zhuang & Vicki M. Bier, 2007. "Balancing Terrorism and Natural Disasters---Defensive Strategy with Endogenous Attacker Effort," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 55(5), pages 976-991, October.
    2. Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Todd Sandler, 2011. "The Interplay Between Preemptive and Defensive Counterterrorism Measures: A Two‐stage Game," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 78(311), pages 546-564, July.
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    4. Powell, Robert, 2007. "Defending against Terrorist Attacks with Limited Resources," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 101(3), pages 527-541, August.
    5. Todd Sandler & Kevin Siqueira, 2006. "Global terrorism: deterrence versus pre‐emption," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 39(4), pages 1370-1387, November.
    6. Vicki M. Bier, 2007. "Choosing What to Protect," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 27(3), pages 607-620, June.
    7. B. Peter Rosendorff & Todd Sandler, 2004. "Too Much of a Good Thing?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(5), pages 657-671, October.
    8. A. J. Novak & G. Feichtinger & G. Leitmann, 2010. "A Differential Game Related to Terrorism: Nash and Stackelberg Strategies," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 144(3), pages 533-555, March.
    9. G. Feichtinger & A. J. Novak, 2008. "Terror and Counterterror Operations: Differential Game with Cyclical Nash Solution," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 139(3), pages 541-556, December.
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