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The Limitations of Fair Division

Author

Listed:
  • Gerald Schneider

    (Department of Politics and Management, Universität Konstanz, Germany)

  • Ulrike Sabrina Krämer

    (Department of Politics and Management, Universität Konstanz, Germany)

Abstract

Mathematical procedures that promise an envy-free, equitable, and efficient solution to distributional conflicts have received widespread attention. Two fair-division mechanisms, adjusted Knaster and proportional Knaster, which are similar to the well-known adjusted-winner procedure, are compared with the less fair divide-and-choose mechanism. Results show that participants largely prefer the adjusted-Knaster procedure to the two alternatives. Adjusted Knaster, closely followed by proportional Knaster, also promises the highest average payoff. Yet the sophisticated mechanisms cease to perform better than divide-and-choose once actors receive the possibility to deviate from the mandatory bargaining protocols of fair-division procedures. The preference for adjusted and proportional Knaster is found to be a partial function of the participants’ psychological profile. The more “antisocial†a participant, the more likely this respondent is to opt for a procedure with a compensatory mechanism.

Suggested Citation

  • Gerald Schneider & Ulrike Sabrina Krämer, 2004. "The Limitations of Fair Division," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(4), pages 506-524, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:48:y:2004:i:4:p:506-524
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002704266148
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Fedor Sandomirskiy & Erel Segal-Halevi, 2019. "Efficient Fair Division with Minimal Sharing," Papers 1908.01669, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.

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