IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jocore/v40y1996i1p134-151.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Trust and Reactions to Messages of Intent in Social Dilemmas

Author

Listed:
  • Craig D. Parks
  • Robert F. Henager
  • Shawn D. Scamahorn

    (Washington State University)

Abstract

This study examined how low- and high-trust individuals react to messages of intended behavior in a social dilemma situation. Subjects played a two-person prisoner's dilemma; the opponent was a reciprocal strategy programmed by the experimenter. During the game, subjects received a message stating that the opponent planned to be cooperative or competitive for the remainder of the game. In Study 1, low trusters reacted to the competitive message by decreasing cooperation but were unaffected by the cooperative message; high trusters reacted to the cooperative message by increasing cooperation but were unaffected by the competitive message. Study 2 showed that a period of unconditional, message-consistent behavior immediately after the message can make low and high trusters responsive to cooperative and competitive messages, respectively. However, the number of unconditional responses was crucial. The study also found that stated intention and message-inconsistent behavior affect perceptions of the opponent's trustworthiness.

Suggested Citation

  • Craig D. Parks & Robert F. Henager & Shawn D. Scamahorn, 1996. "Trust and Reactions to Messages of Intent in Social Dilemmas," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 40(1), pages 134-151, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:40:y:1996:i:1:p:134-151
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002796040001007
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002796040001007
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0022002796040001007?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jonathan Bendor & Roderick M. Kramer & Suzanne Stout, 1991. "When in Doubt..," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 35(4), pages 691-719, December.
    2. Rapoport, Amnon & Eshed-Levy, Dalit, 1989. "Provision of step-level public goods: Effects of greed and fear of being gypped," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 325-344, December.
    3. Hilty, John A. & Carnevale, Peter J., 1993. "Black-Hat/White-Hat Strategy in Bilateral Negotiation," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 444-469, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Elinor Ostrom, 2010. "Analyzing collective action," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 41(s1), pages 155-166, November.
    2. Shay S. Tzafrir & Rudolph Joseph Sanchez & Keren Tirosh-Unger, 2012. "Social Motives and Trust: Implications for Joint Gains in Negotiations," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 21(6), pages 839-862, November.
    3. Chaudhuri, Ananish & Li, Yaxiong & Paichayontvijit, Tirnud, 2016. "What’s in a frame? Goal framing, trust and reciprocity," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 117-135.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. David M. McEvoy & James J. Murphy & John M. Spraggon & John K. Stranlund, 2011. "The problem of maintaining compliance within stable coalitions: experimental evidence," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(3), pages 475-498, July.
    2. Kent D. Messer & Todd M. Schmit & Harry M. Kaiser, 2005. "Optimal Institutional Mechanisms for Funding Generic Advertising: An Experimental Analysis," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 87(4), pages 1046-1060.
    3. Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite, 2007. "Effecting Cooperation," PIER Working Paper Archive 09-019, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 29 May 2009.
    4. Paton Pak Chun Yam & Gary Ting Tat Ng & Wing Tung Au & Lin Tao & Su Lu & Hildie Leung & Jane M Y Fung, 2018. "The effect of subgroup homogeneity of efficacy on contribution in public good dilemmas," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(7), pages 1-18, July.
    5. Edward Cartwright & Anna Stepanova, 2017. "Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1163-1191, November.
    6. Kopelman, Shirli & Rosette, Ashleigh Shelby & Thompson, Leigh, 2006. "The three faces of Eve: Strategic displays of positive, negative, and neutral emotions in negotiations," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 81-101, January.
    7. Marc Harper & Vincent Knight & Martin Jones & Georgios Koutsovoulos & Nikoleta E Glynatsi & Owen Campbell, 2017. "Reinforcement learning produces dominant strategies for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 12(12), pages 1-33, December.
    8. O'Connor, Kathleen M., 1997. "Groups and Solos in Context: The Effects of Accountability on Team Negotiation," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 384-407, December.
    9. Beersma, Bianca & De Dreu, Carsten K. W., 2002. "Integrative and Distributive Negotiation in Small Groups: Effects of Task Structure, Decision Rule, and Social Motive," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 227-252, March.
    10. Gelfand, Michele J. & Christakopoulou, Sophia, 1999. "Culture and Negotiator Cognition: Judgment Accuracy and Negotiation Processes in Individualistic and Collectivistic Cultures, , , ," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 248-269, September.
    11. Bottom, William P., 1998. "Negotiator Risk: Sources of Uncertainty and the Impact of Reference Points on Negotiated Agreements," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 89-112, November.
    12. Laura Gee & Michael Schreck, 2016. "Do Beliefs About Peers Matter for Donation Matching? Experiments in the Field and Laboratory," Framed Field Experiments 00538, The Field Experiments Website.
    13. Bart S. Vanneste & Douglas H. Frank, 2014. "Forgiveness in Vertical Relationships: Incentive and Termination Effects," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(6), pages 1807-1822, December.
    14. Rose, Steven K. & Clark, Jeremy & Poe, Gregory L. & Rondeau, Daniel & Schulze, William D., 2002. "The private provision of public goods: tests of a provision point mechanism for funding green power programs," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 131-155, February.
    15. Bram Cadsby, Charles & Maynes, Elizabeth, 1998. "Choosing between a socially efficient and free-riding equilibrium: Nurses versus economics and business students," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 183-192, October.
    16. Thomas Chadefaux & Dirk Helbing, 2012. "The Rationality of Prejudices," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 7(2), pages 1-6, February.
    17. Bicchieri, Cristina & Erte, Xiao, 2007. "Do the right thing: But only if others do so," MPRA Paper 4609, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Robert, Christopher & Carnevale, Peter J., 1997. "Group Choice in Ultimatum Bargaining," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 256-279, November.
    19. Choi, Sukwoong & Kim, Wonjoon & Kim, Namil, 2022. "International alliance formations: The role of brokerage in technology competition networks," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 440-449.
    20. Evans, Alecia & Sesmero, Juan Pablo, 2022. "Noisy Payoffs in an Infinitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma – Experimental Evidence," 2022 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Anaheim, California 322434, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:40:y:1996:i:1:p:134-151. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://pss.la.psu.edu/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.