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Alliance Formation and General Deterrence

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  • Gerald L. Sorokin

    (University of Iowa)

Abstract

This article studies the relationship between alliance formation and general deterrence in regional rivalries. In a game-theoretic model under complete information, an alliance is formed only when the potential ally would not intervene without one and would always intervene with one. General deterrence succeeds under complete information unless the potential attacker is stronger than the target and values the stakes highly, and the potential ally would never intervene. When incomplete information is added to the game, alliances are sometimes formed even when the potential ally's behavior would be unaffected by the alliance. Additionally, general deterrence under incomplete information sometimes fails because of the potential attacker's mistaken beliefs about the probability that the target would win or the potential ally would intervene. The model is illustrated by examining the conflict between Israel and its rivals, Egypt and Syria, taking into account the role of the United States as Israel's potential ally. The combination of game theory and empirical analysis is theoretically richer and empirically more informative than previous analyses of Israeli general deterrence and alliance behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Gerald L. Sorokin, 1994. "Alliance Formation and General Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(2), pages 298-325, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:38:y:1994:i:2:p:298-325
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002794038002006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Huth, Paul & Russett, Bruce, 1993. "General Deterrence between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(1), pages 61-73, March.
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