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Force and Influence in International Crises

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  • James Meernik

    (University of North Texas)

Abstract

Given the high degree of scholarly interest in the political use of military force and its prominence in international relations, I believe the time is ripe to develop a framework for analyzing the utility of such military operations. Using the political use of military force by the United States from 1953-1978 as my empirical referent, I develop a simple, but testable framework for explaining under what conditions a state is able to influence another to undertake some behavior. I find that when examining the short-term outcomes of incidents involving the political use of military force, the U.S. is more likely to achieve positive outcomes when its level of relative capabilities is greater and when it seeks to deter rather than compel its targets. In the long term, positive crisis outcomes for the United States are associated with U.S. credibility, target predisposition and deterrence objectives.

Suggested Citation

  • James Meernik, 1999. "Force and Influence in International Crises," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 17(1), pages 103-131, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:17:y:1999:i:1:p:103-131
    DOI: 10.1177/073889429901700104
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    References listed on IDEAS

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