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System Uncertainty, Risk Propensity, and International Conflict among the Great Powers

Author

Listed:
  • Paul Huth
  • D. Scott Bennett
  • Christopher Gelpi

    (University of Michigan)

Abstract

The authors investigate the relationship between system structure and the initiation of militarized disputes among Great Powers. The central hypotheses concern the interaction between system uncertainty and the risk propensity of national decision makers. The authors employ a research design that enables them to incorporate explanatory variables from various levels of analysis into their theoretical model. The model is tested by probit analysis on a pooled time series of Great Power rival dyads from 1816 to 1975. The empirical results support the central hypothesis that the effects of the international system are mediated by the risk propensity of decision makers. In addition, the authors find that dyadic- and unit-level variables such as arms races, power transitions, and the current and past dispute behavior of rivals also have significant effects on conflict behavior. Finally, the results indicate that nuclear weapons do not seem to have a systematic impact on the initiation of militarized disputes among Great Powers.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Huth & D. Scott Bennett & Christopher Gelpi, 1992. "System Uncertainty, Risk Propensity, and International Conflict among the Great Powers," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 36(3), pages 478-517, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:36:y:1992:i:3:p:478-517
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002792036003004
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Waltz, Kenneth N., 1990. "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 730-745, September.
    2. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 2013. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Leonard C MacLean & William T Ziemba (ed.), HANDBOOK OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING Part I, chapter 6, pages 99-127, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Quattrone, George A. & Tversky, Amos, 1988. "Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(3), pages 719-736, September.
    4. Doran, Charles F. & Parsons, Wes, 1980. "War and the Cycle of Relative Power," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(4), pages 947-965, December.
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