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Mediation of Prisoners' Dilemma Conflicts and the Importance of the Cooperation Threshold

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  • Marc A. Levy

    (Department of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies)

Abstract

The dynamics of moving a deadlocked prisoners' dilemma conflict toward a cooperative resolution are examined. The effects of recalcitrant parties are elaborated by developing the concepts of the imposed deadlock game and the cooperation threshold. The threshold is the degree of certainty of achieving a cooperative solution (the R payoff) necessary to induce cooperation. It is lowered (making cooperation more likely) when either the benefits from cooperating or the costs of holding out increase. This concept is used to explain how agreement can be reached on seemingly nonnegotiable issues. In U.S. efforts to mediate the Numibia conflict, both Carter and Reagan failed to deal effectively with South Africa's high cooperation threshold. The Reagan administration also added elements of simultaneous play by introducing linkage, further lessening cooperative prospects. Cooperation may nevertheless have become more likely when South Africa began pursuing a different, more certain, cooperative goal. However, inappropriate mediation and unfavorable events made a final agreement impossible.

Suggested Citation

  • Marc A. Levy, 1985. "Mediation of Prisoners' Dilemma Conflicts and the Importance of the Cooperation Threshold," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 29(4), pages 581-603, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:29:y:1985:i:4:p:581-603
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002785029004002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Axelrod, Robert, 1981. "The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 75(2), pages 306-318, June.
    2. J. Keith Murnighan & Alvin E. Roth, 1983. "Expecting Continued Play in Prisoner's Dilemma Games," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 27(2), pages 279-300, June.
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