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Perspectives for Understanding Negotiation

Author

Listed:
  • Margaret A. Neale

    (Department of Management and Policy, University of Arizona)

  • Max H. Bazerman

    (Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Abstract

Bargaining and negotiation research has traditionally been of significant interest to those in the industrial relations field. The current work in this area may be divided into four common perspectives: economic models, structural effects, personality differences in negotiators, and behavioral systems approaches. These approaches, however, do not explain the failure of negotiators to reach mutually beneficial agreements. To complement the existing literature, a fifth framework is proposed. Viewing negotiation as a decisionmaking process is posited to explain, in part, the negotiators' failure to reach such agreements.

Suggested Citation

  • Margaret A. Neale & Max H. Bazerman, 1985. "Perspectives for Understanding Negotiation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 29(1), pages 33-55, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:29:y:1985:i:1:p:33-55
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002785029001003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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