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Disagreement in Bargaining

Author

Listed:
  • Michael W.K. Malouf

    (Department of Business Administration University of Illinois)

  • Alvin E. Roth

    (Department of Business Administration University of Illinois)

Abstract

This study reports an experiment designed to test the predictive value of Axelrod's measure of conflict of interest. The results support the conclusion that Axelrod's measure is a good predictor of the time required to reach agreement in a given bargaining game, but that it is not a good pedictor of the frequency with which disagreements will be observed in a given game. The theoretical implications of this conclusion are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael W.K. Malouf & Alvin E. Roth, 1981. "Disagreement in Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 25(2), pages 329-348, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:25:y:1981:i:2:p:329-348
    DOI: 10.1177/002200278102500206
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    2. Roger B. Myerson, 1980. "Solutions for Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 432, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Feltovich, Nick & Swierzbinski, Joe, 2011. "The role of strategic uncertainty in games: An experimental study of cheap talk and contracts in the Nash demand game," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 554-574, May.
    2. Babcock, Linda & Loewenstein, George & Wang, Xianghong, 1995. "The relationship between uncertainty, the contract zone, and efficiency in a bargaining experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 475-485, August.
    3. Sigbjørn Birkeland & Bertil Tungodden, 2014. "Fairness motivation in bargaining: a matter of principle," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(1), pages 125-151, June.
    4. David A. Lax & James K. Sebenius, 1991. "Negotiating Through an Agent," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 35(3), pages 474-493, September.
    5. Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2003. "Inefficiencies in a Model of Team Formation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 195-215, May.
    6. repec:eee:labchp:v:2:y:1986:i:c:p:1091-1137 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, 2004. "When Ignorance Is Bliss: Information Exchange and Inefficiency in Bargaining," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 37-58, January.
    8. Cary Deck & Amy Farmer & Dao-Zhi Zeng, 2007. "Amended final-offer arbitration over an uncertain value: A comparison with CA and FOA," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(4), pages 439-454, December.
    9. Ulan Kasymov & Dimitrios Zikos, 2017. "Understanding Human Actions and Institutional Change: What Are the Impacts of Power Asymmetries on Efficiency in Pasture Use?," Resources, MDPI, vol. 6(4), pages 1-19, December.
    10. Anbarci, Nejat & Feltovich, Nick, 2012. "Bargaining with random implementation: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 495-514.
    11. Alberto Casagrande & Marco Spallone, 2007. "Investigating the determinants of pretrial settlement rates: contingent versus non-contingent lawyers’ fees," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 1-13, August.

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