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The Necessity to Discuss ‘Deterrence Failure’ Regarding North Korea’s Nuclear Threat

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  • Hwee-Rhak Park

Abstract

This article introduces the ‘deterrence failure’ concept and applies it to North Korea’s nuclear threat situation. For this purpose, it selects five factors, including retaliation posture; credibility of retaliation; probability of the challenger’s success; challenger’s irrational leader; and situational desperateness, to evaluate the US–South Korea nuclear deterrence posture against North Korea. Except for the retaliation posture, most factors are very concerning. Therefore, to strengthen their deterrence posture against North Korea, the United States and South Korea should take a few practical measures to ensure the implementation of the US extended deterrence, including the forward-deployment of more US retaliation assets around the Korean Peninsula.

Suggested Citation

  • Hwee-Rhak Park, 2023. "The Necessity to Discuss ‘Deterrence Failure’ Regarding North Korea’s Nuclear Threat," International Studies, , vol. 60(1), pages 67-90, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:intstu:v:60:y:2023:i:1:p:67-90
    DOI: 10.1177/00208817231154389
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kroenig, Matthew, 2013. "Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(1), pages 141-171, January.
    2. Manseok Lee & Sangmin Lee, 2020. "North Korea’s choice of a nuclear strategy: a dynamic approach," Defense & Security Analysis, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(4), pages 377-397, October.
    3. Powell, Robert, 2015. "Nuclear Brinkmanship, Limited War, and Military Power," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(3), pages 589-626, July.
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