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Nuclear Brinkmanship, Limited War, and Military Power

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  • Powell, Robert

Abstract

An open question in nuclear deterrence theory is whether and how the balance of military power affects the dynamics of escalation. The balance of military strength plays virtually no role in standard accounts of brinkmanship. But this is largely by assumption and seems incompatible with an apparent trade-off between power and risk that decision makers have faced in some actual crises. This paper incorporates this trade-off in a modified model of nuclear brinkmanship. A main result is that the more likely the balance of resolve is to favor a defender, the less military power a challenger brings to bear. The model also formalizes the stability-instability paradox, showing that a less stable strategic balance, that is, a sharper trade-off between power and risk, makes conflict at high levels of violence less likely but conflict at lower levels more likely. The analysis also helps explain the incentives different states have to adopt different nuclear doctrines and force postures.

Suggested Citation

  • Powell, Robert, 2015. "Nuclear Brinkmanship, Limited War, and Military Power," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(3), pages 589-626, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:69:y:2015:i:03:p:589-626_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Jon R Lindsay, 2024. "Abducted by hackers: Using the case of Bletchley Park to construct a theory of intelligence performance that generalizes to cybersecurity," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 61(1), pages 87-102, January.
    2. Katsuzo Yamamoto, 2024. "A new formal model analysis of deterrent to brinkmanship and the causes of the armament dilemma," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 36(2), pages 132-155, April.
    3. Hwee-Rhak Park, 2023. "The Necessity to Discuss ‘Deterrence Failure’ Regarding North Korea’s Nuclear Threat," International Studies, , vol. 60(1), pages 67-90, January.
    4. Pradeep, Siddhartha, 2019. "Game theory, Strategies and the convoluted triangle - India, Pakistan, Kashmir," EconStor Preprints 195929, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.

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