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Demand without supply? Mass partisanship, ideological attachments, and the puzzle of Guatemala's electoral market failure

Author

Listed:
  • Patricio Navia

    (5894Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago, Chile)

  • Lucas Perelló

    (172200Marymount Manhattan College, New York, NY, USA)

  • Vaclav Masek

    (5116University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA)

Abstract

The demand for an ideologically based party system is not always met with a supply. As a country where a large majority of adults identify on the ideological scale but whose weak political parties primarily function as short-lived personalist platforms, Guatemala represents an extreme case of a demand supply mismatch. Using six AmericasBarometer surveys from 2008 to 2018, we analyze the supply-side (partisanship) and demand-side (ideological identification) effect on voter turnout to identify whether the manifestation of this market failure applies evenly to voters across the ideological scale. We report a nuanced outcome: partisanship and identification on the right of the ideological scale increase turnout, but identification on the center or the left display no significant effect. The absence of parties that effectively represents left-wing or centrist voters—or that at least induce them to turn out to vote—points to a supply-side problem in Guatemala's political representation market.

Suggested Citation

  • Patricio Navia & Lucas Perelló & Vaclav Masek, 2022. "Demand without supply? Mass partisanship, ideological attachments, and the puzzle of Guatemala's electoral market failure," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 25(2), pages 99-120, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:intare:v:25:y:2022:i:2:p:99-120
    DOI: 10.1177/22338659211072939
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roberts, Kenneth M. & Wibbels, Erik, 1999. "Party Systems and Electoral Volatility in Latin America: A Test of Economic, Institutional, and Structural Explanations," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 93(3), pages 575-590, September.
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    3. Mark P. Jones, 2011. "Weakly Institutionalized Party Systems and Presidential Democracy: Evidence from Guatemala," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 14(4), pages 3-30, December.
    4. Saiegh, Sebastián M., 2015. "Using Joint Scaling Methods to Study Ideology and Representation: Evidence from Latin America," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(3), pages 363-384, July.
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