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Weakly Institutionalized Party Systems and Presidential Democracy: Evidence from Guatemala

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  • Mark P. Jones

Abstract

Today, all of Latin America's presidential republics are at least nominal democracies, with the region's past experience with frequent military coups an increasingly distant memory. As a result, over the past two decades, many scholars concerned with the health of Latin America's presidential democracies have shifted their focus from those factors which contribute to the consolidation or breakdown of presidential democracies to those which influence the manner in which these democracies operate. In particular, scholars have endeavored to better understand the manner in which constitutional and partisan institutions strengthen or weaken the functioning of a country's democratic system. As the linchpin of a democratic system, political parties have a profound impact on the quality of democracy in a nation. This article highlights the case of Guatemala, where a very weakly institutionalized political party system has had a negative impact on the functioning of the country's presidential democracy. After underscoring Guatemala's status as one of Latin America's least institutionalized party systems via a cross-national analysis of the region's presidential democracies, the article analyzes in detail the limited institutionalization of the Guatemalan party system from a variety of vantage points ranging from the level of temporal volatility in voting patterns within the electorate to the amount of party switching among legislators.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark P. Jones, 2011. "Weakly Institutionalized Party Systems and Presidential Democracy: Evidence from Guatemala," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 14(4), pages 3-30, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:intare:v:14:y:2011:i:4:p:3-30
    DOI: 10.1177/223386591101400402
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Carlos Scartascini & Ernesto H. Stein & Mariano Tommasi & Mark P. Jones & Sebastián Saiegh & Mariana Magaldi de Sousa & Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo & Laura Zuvanic & Mercedes Iacoviello & Ana Laura Rodr, 2010. "How Democracy Works: Political Institutions, Actors and Arenas in Latin American Policymaking," IDB Publications (Books), Inter-American Development Bank, number 34665 edited by Carlos Scartascini & Ernesto H. Stein & Mariano Tommasi, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Patricio Navia & Lucas Perelló & Vaclav Masek, 2022. "Demand without supply? Mass partisanship, ideological attachments, and the puzzle of Guatemala's electoral market failure," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 25(2), pages 99-120, June.
    2. Klick, Matthew T., 2016. "The Effect of State–Local Complementarity and Local Governance on Development: A Comparative Analysis from Post-War Guatemala," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 1-13.

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