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Does Tactical Voting Matter? The Political Impact of Tactical Voting in Canadian Elections

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  • HeeMin Kim
  • Tatiana Kostadinova

Abstract

Tactical voting primarily takes place under single-member district plurality electoral institutions and takes the form of third-party supporters voting for one of the major parties. Although much has been written about tactical voting, few studies have attempted to show its impact on seat distribution within the parliament or on the makeup of the subsequent government, in countries with single-member plurality systems. In this article, we assess the magnitude and impact of tactical voting in0 the Canadian general elections between 1988 and 2000. We build a model of tactical voting by identifying factors that are known to affect the level of tactical voting that we can measure using available data. Based on this model, we generate predicted levels of tactical voting for all parties within each district, and then use these predicted values to adjust the actual election data to produce a new set of data containing a would-be election outcome in the absence of tactical voting. By comparing actual election data, adjusted election data, and the seat share of political parties in the parliament after these elections, we discuss the political impact of tactical voting in Canada. The results of our study affirm that, in some cases, tactical voting does lead to election outcomes different from those in its absence and that arguments based on voter rationality are to some degree valid in the real world. At the same time, our results demonstrate that the impact of tactical voting on election outcomes, and thus on the actual distribution of seats within the parliament, has been minimal in Canada. It had no impact on the partisan composition of the government in any of the four elections studied.

Suggested Citation

  • HeeMin Kim & Tatiana Kostadinova, 2011. "Does Tactical Voting Matter? The Political Impact of Tactical Voting in Canadian Elections," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 14(1), pages 49-72, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:intare:v:14:y:2011:i:1:p:49-72
    DOI: 10.1177/223386591101400103
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tsebelis, George, 1986. "A General Model of Tactical and Inverse Tactical Voting," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(3), pages 395-404, July.
    2. Galbraith, John W. & Rae, Nicol C., 1989. "A Test of the Importance of Tactical Voting: Great Britain, 1987," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 126-136, January.
    3. Niemi, Richard G. & Written, Guy & Franklin, Mark N., 1992. "Constituency Characteristics, Individual Characteristics and Tactical Voting in the 1987 British General Election," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(2), pages 229-240, April.
    4. Alvarez, R. Michael & Nagler, Jonathan, 2000. "A New Approach for Modelling Strategic Voting in Multiparty Elections," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 30(1), pages 57-75, January.
    5. Niemi, Richard & Whitten, Guy & Franklin, Mark, 1993. "People Who Live in Glass Houses: A Response to Evans and Heath's Critique of our Note on Tactical Voting," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(4), pages 549-553, October.
    6. Johnston, R. J. & Pattie, C. J., 1991. "Tactical Voting in Great Britain in 1983 and 1987: An Alternative Approach," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(1), pages 95-108, January.
    7. Evans, Geoffrey & Heath, Anthony, 1993. "A Tactical Error in the Analysis of Tactical Voting: A Response to Niemi, Whitten and Franklin," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(1), pages 131-137, January.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Artabe, Alaitz & Gardeazabal, Javier, 2014. "Strategic Votes and Sincere Counterfactuals," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(2), pages 243-257, April.

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