Understanding Spatial Variation in Tax Sheltering: The Role of Demographics, Ideology, and Taxes
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1177/0160017609336536
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Raj Chetty, 2009.
"Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance,"
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 31-52, August.
- Raj Chetty, 2008. "Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance," NBER Working Papers 13844, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Chetty, Nadarajan, 2009. "Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance," Scholarly Articles 9748527, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002.
"Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration,"
Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470,
Elsevier.
- Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, 2000. "Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration," NBER Working Papers 7473, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Joel Slemrod, 2001.
"A General Model of the Behavioral Response to Taxation,"
International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 8(2), pages 119-128, March.
- Joel Slemrod, 1998. "A General Model of the Behavioral Response to Taxation," NBER Working Papers 6582, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- David Albouy, 2009.
"The Unequal Geographic Burden of Federal Taxation,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(4), pages 635-667, August.
- David Y. Albouy, 2008. "The Unequal Geographic Burden of Federal Taxation," NBER Working Papers 13995, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dubin, Jeffrey A. & Wilde, Louis L., 1988. "An Empirical Analysis of Federal Income Tax Auditing and Compliance," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 41(1), pages 61-74, March.
- Erzo F. P. Luttmer, 2001.
"Group Loyalty and the Taste for Redistribution,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(3), pages 500-528, June.
- Erzo F.P. Luttmer, 1999. "Group Loyalty and the Taste for Redistribution," JCPR Working Papers 61, Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Center for Poverty Research.
- Erzo F.P. Luttmer, 1999. "Group Loyalty and the Taste for Redistribution," Working Papers 9902, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago.
- Thomas J. Holmes, 1998. "The Effect of State Policies on the Location of Manufacturing: Evidence from State Borders," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(4), pages 667-705, August.
- Martin Feldstein, 1999.
"Tax Avoidance And The Deadweight Loss Of The Income Tax,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 81(4), pages 674-680, November.
- Martin Feldstein, 1995. "Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax," NBER Working Papers 5055, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
- Dubin, Jeffrey A. & Wilde, Louis L., 1988. "An Empirical Analysis of Federal Income Tax Auditing and Compliance," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 41(1), pages 61-74, March.
- Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 1974. "Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 201-202, May.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Julio López-Laborda & Jaime Vallés-Giménez & Anabel Zárate-Marco, 2021. "Personal Income Tax Compliance at the Regional Level: The Role of Persistence, Neighborhood, and Decentralization," International Regional Science Review, , vol. 44(2), pages 289-317, March.
- James Alm & Jeremy Clark & Kara Leibel, 2016.
"Enforcement, Socioeconomic Diversity, and Tax Filing Compliance in the United States,"
Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 82(3), pages 725-747, January.
- James Alm & Jeremy Clark & Kara Leibel, 2015. "Enforcement, Socio-Economic Diversity, and Tax Filing Compliance in the United States," Working Papers 1514, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
- James Alm & Jeremy Clark & Kara Leibel, 2011. "Socio-economic Diversity, Social Capital, and Tax Filing Compliance in the United States," Working Papers in Economics 11/35, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Samreen Malik & Benedikt Mihm & Florian Timme, 2018. "An experimental analysis of tax avoidance policies," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(1), pages 200-239, February.
- Kalina Koleva, 2005. "A la recherche de l'administration fiscale optimale : l'approche par les coûts d'efficience," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques r05050, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- Kleven, Henrik & Best, Michael & Spinnewijn, Johannes & Waseem, Mazhar & Brockmeyer, Anne, 2013. "Production vs Revenue Efficiency With Limited Tax Capacity: Theory and Evidence From Pakistan," CEPR Discussion Papers 9717, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Michael Carlos Best & Anne Brockmeyer & Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Johannes Spinnewijn & Mazhar Waseem, 2015.
"Production versus Revenue Efficiency with Limited Tax Capacity: Theory and Evidence from Pakistan,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 123(6), pages 1311-1355.
- Best, Michael Carlos & Brockmeyer, Anne & Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen & Spinnewijn, Johannes & Waseem, Mazhar, 2015. "Production versus revenue efficiency with limited tax capacity: theory and evidence from Pakistan," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 64916, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002.
"Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration,"
Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470,
Elsevier.
- Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, 2000. "Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration," NBER Working Papers 7473, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Uribe-Terán, Carlos, 2021. "Higher taxes at the top? The role of tax avoidance," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
- Cerqueti, Roy & Coppier, Raffaella, 2011.
"Economic growth, corruption and tax evasion,"
Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(1-2), pages 489-500, January.
- Cerqueti, Roy & Coppier, Raffaella, 2011. "Economic growth, corruption and tax evasion," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 489-500.
- Roy Cerqueti & Raffaella Coppier, 2009. "Economic growth, corruption and tax evasion," Working Papers 58-2009, Macerata University, Department of Finance and Economic Sciences, revised Jan 2010.
- Duccio Gamannossi degl’Innocenti & Matthew D. Rablen, 2017. "Tax avoidance and optimal income tax enforcement," IFS Working Papers W17/08, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Henrik J. Kleven & Martin B. Knudsen & Claus T. Kreiner & Søren Pedersen & Emmanuel Saez, 2010. "Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence from a Randomized Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark," NBER Working Papers 15769, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Doerrenberg, Philipp & Duncan, Denvil & Fuest, Clemens & Peichl, Andreas, 2012.
"Nice Guys Finish Last: Are People with Higher Tax Morale Taxed More Heavily?,"
IZA Discussion Papers
6275, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Philipp Doerrenberg & Denvil Duncan & Clemens Fuest & Andreas Peichl, 2012. "Nice guys finish last: are people with higher tax morale taxed more heavily?," Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series 03-02, Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences.
- Philipp Doerrenberg & Denvil Duncan & Clemens Fuest & Andreas Peichl, 2012. "Nice Guys Finish Last: Are People with Higher Tax Morale Taxed more Heavily?," CESifo Working Paper Series 3858, CESifo.
- Tamás K. Papp & Elöd Takáts, 2008. "Tax Rate Cuts and Tax Compliance—The Laffer Curve Revisited," IMF Working Papers 2008/007, International Monetary Fund.
- Torgler, Benno & Schneider, Friedrich & Schaltegger, Christoph A., 2007.
"With or Against the People? The Impact of a Bottom-Up Approach on Tax Morale and the Shadow Economy,"
Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series
qt6331x6vz, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
- Benno Torgler & Friedrich Schneider & Christoph A. Schaltegger, 2007. "With or Against the People? The Impact of a Bottom-Up Approach on Tax Morale and the Shadow Economy," CREMA Working Paper Series 2007-04, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Berger, Melissa & Fellner-Röhling, Gerlinde & Sausgruber, Rupert & Traxler, Christian, 2016.
"Higher taxes, more evasion? Evidence from border differentials in TV license fees,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 74-86.
- Berger, Melissa & Fellner-Röhling, Gerlinde & Sausgruber, Rupert & Traxler, Christian, 2015. "Higher taxes, more evasion? Evidence from border differentials in TV license fees," ZEW Discussion Papers 15-008, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Melissa Berger & Gerlinde Fellner & Rupert Sausgruber & Christian Traxler, 2015. "Higher Taxes, More Evasion? Evidence from Border Differentials in TV License Fees," CESifo Working Paper Series 5195, CESifo.
- Kalina Koleva, 2005. "Seeking for an optimal tax administration: the efficiency costs’ approach [A la recherche de l'administration fiscale optimale : l'approche par les coûts d'efficience]," Post-Print halshs-00195354, HAL.
- Fabio Lamantia & Mario Pezzino & Fabio Tramontana, 2017. "Tax Evasion, Intrinsic Motivation, and the Evolutionary Effects of Tax Reforms," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1707, Economics, The University of Manchester.
- Kristoffer Berg & Thor O. Thoresen, 2020.
"Problematic response margins in the estimation of the elasticity of taxable income,"
International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(3), pages 721-752, June.
- Kristoffer Berg & Thor O. Thoresen, 2016. "Problematic response margins in the estimation of the elasticity of taxable income," Discussion Papers 851, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
- Fack, Gabrielle & Landais, Camille, 2016.
"The effect of tax enforcement on tax elasticities: Evidence from charitable contributions in France,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 23-40.
- Gabrielle Fack & Camille Landais, 2013. "The effect of tax enforcement on tax elasticities: Evidence from charitable contributions in France," Economics Working Papers 1406, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Fack, Gabrielle & Landais, Camille, 2016. "The effect of tax enforcement on tax elasticities: evidence from charitable contributions in France," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 64578, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Gabrielle Fack & Camille Landais, 2016. "The effect of tax enforcement on tax elasticities: Evidence from charitable contributions in France," Post-Print hal-01300122, HAL.
- Gabrielle Fack & Camille Landais, 2016. "The effect of tax enforcement on tax elasticities: Evidence from charitable contributions in France," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-01300122, HAL.
- Gabrielle Fack & Camille Landais, 2016. "The effect of tax enforcement on tax elasticities: Evidence from charitable contributions in France," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01300122, HAL.
- Laura Blow & Ian Preston, 2002. "Deadweight loss and taxation of earned income: evidence from tax records of the UK self-employed," IFS Working Papers W02/15, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Helmut Herwartz & Bernd Theilen, 2013. "Does the EU Financing System Contribute to Shadow Economic Activity?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 135-161, July.
- Martin Halla & Friedrich G. Schneider, 2005.
"Taxes and Benefits: Two Distinct Options to Cheat on the State?,"
Economics working papers
2005-05, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- Halla, Martin & Schneider, Friedrich, 2008. "Taxes and Benefits: Two Distinct Options to Cheat on the State?," IZA Discussion Papers 3536, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
More about this item
Keywords
tax sheltering; elasticity of taxable income; political support for taxation;All these keywords.
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:inrsre:v:32:y:2009:i:3:p:400-423. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.