IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/ijcgvn/v17y2024i1p63-76.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Family Versus External Block Holders’ Ownership and Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from India

Author

Listed:
  • Himani Chahal

Abstract

This article studies the non-linear relation between family ownership and firm performance (FP) in the Indian context by taking firms listed on NSE 500. The sample firms are investigated for 11 years, 2011–2021. The article also tries to study the impact of various categories of external block holders on the performance of Indian family firms due to their capacity to pressure management and monitor their actions. The study results show a U-shaped relation between family ownership and Indian family firms’ performance, as depicted by ROA and TQ. The findings further suggest that two prominent kinds of outside block holders that have been observed to be related to greater performance in family firms are government and foreign institutional shareholders. Thus, it can be assumed that these external block holders’ greater monitoring ability is linked with reduced agency costs and increased FP. The study is unique in finding out the influence of the ownership and governance mechanisms in the sample of Indian family firms on their performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Himani Chahal, 2024. "Family Versus External Block Holders’ Ownership and Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from India," Indian Journal of Corporate Governance, , vol. 17(1), pages 63-76, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ijcgvn:v:17:y:2024:i:1:p:63-76
    DOI: 10.1177/09746862241244927
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09746862241244927
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/09746862241244927?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael H. Lubatkin & Yan Ling & William S. Schulze, 2007. "An Organizational Justice‐Based View of Self‐Control and Agency Costs in Family Firms," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(6), pages 955-971, September.
    2. Lins, Karl V., 2003. "Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 159-184, March.
    3. Eddleston, Kimberly A. & Kellermanns, Franz W., 2007. "Destructive and productive family relationships: A stewardship theory perspective," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 545-565, July.
    4. Gedajlovic, Eric & Cao, Qing & Zhang, Hongping, 2012. "Corporate shareholdings and organizational ambidexterity in high-tech SMEs: Evidence from a transitional economy," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 652-665.
    5. Habbershon, Timothy G. & Williams, Mary & MacMillan, Ian C., 2003. "A unified systems perspective of family firm performance," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 451-465, July.
    6. Andres, Christian, 2008. "Large shareholders and firm performance--An empirical examination of founding-family ownership," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 431-445, September.
    7. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    8. Kim, Y. & Gao, F.Y., 2013. "Does family involvement increase business performance? Family-longevity goals’ moderating role in Chinese family firms," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 265-274.
    9. Michael Lubatkin & Yan Ling & William S. Schulze, 2007. "An organizational justice-based view of self-control and agency costs in family firms," Post-Print hal-02311795, HAL.
    10. Michael N. Young & Mike W. Peng & David Ahlstrom & Garry D. Bruton & Yi Jiang, 2008. "Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal–Principal Perspective," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 196-220, January.
    11. repec:bla:jfinan:v:58:y:2003:i:3:p:1301-1327 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. William S. Schulze & Michael H. Lubatkin & Richard N. Dino & Ann K. Buchholtz, 2001. "Agency Relationships in Family Firms: Theory and Evidence," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 12(2), pages 99-116, April.
    13. Miller, Danny & Le Breton-Miller, Isabelle & Lester, Richard H. & Cannella Jr., Albert A., 2007. "Are family firms really superior performers?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(5), pages 829-858, December.
    14. Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, 2003. "Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1301-1328, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mazzi, Chiara, 2011. "Family business and financial performance: Current state of knowledge and future research challenges," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 166-181.
    2. Geoffrey Martin & Luis R. Gómez–Mejía & Pascual Berrone & Marianna Makri, 2017. "Conflict between Controlling Family Owners and Minority Shareholders: Much Ado about Nothing?," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 41(6), pages 999-1027, November.
    3. Xiaowei Rose Luo & Chi-Nien Chung, 2013. "Filling or Abusing the Institutional Void? Ownership and Management Control of Public Family Businesses in an Emerging Market," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 24(2), pages 591-613, April.
    4. Achleitner, Ann-Kristin & Kaserer, Christoph & Kauf, Tobias, 2012. "The dynamics of voting ownership in lone-founder, family-founder, and heir firms," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 79-96.
    5. Mike W. Peng & Yi Jiang, 2010. "Institutions Behind Family Ownership and Control in Large Firms," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(2), pages 253-273, March.
    6. Patricio Duran & Marcelo Ortiz, 2020. "When More Is Better: Multifamily Firms and Firm Performance," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 44(4), pages 761-783, July.
    7. Breton-Miller, Isabelle Le & Miller, Danny, 2016. "Family firms and practices of sustainability: A contingency view," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 26-33.
    8. Veider, Viktoria & Matzler, Kurt, 2016. "The ability and willingness of family-controlled firms to arrive at organizational ambidexterity," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 105-116.
    9. Mike W. Peng & Wei Sun & Cristina Vlas & Alessandro Minichilli & Guido Corbetta, 2018. "An Institution-Based View of Large Family Firms: A Recap and Overview," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 42(2), pages 187-205, March.
    10. Vincenzo Scafarto & Federica Ricci & Elisabetta Magnaghi & Salvatore Ferri, 2021. "Board structure and intellectual capital efficiency: does the family firm status matter?," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 25(3), pages 841-878, September.
    11. David G. Sirmon & Jean–Luc Arregle & Michael A. Hitt & Justin W. Webb, 2008. "The Role of Family Influence in Firms’ Strategic Responses to Threat of Imitation," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 32(6), pages 979-998, November.
    12. Guidice, Rebecca M. & Mero, Neal P. & Greene, Juanne V., 2013. "Perceptions of accountability in family business: Using accountability theory to understand differences between family and nonfamily executives," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 233-244.
    13. Franco Ernesto Rubino & Paolo Tenuta & Domenico Rocco Cambrea, 2017. "Board characteristics effects on performance in family and non-family business: a multi-theoretical approach," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 21(3), pages 623-658, September.
    14. Suveera Gill & Parmjit Kaur, 2015. "Family Involvement in Business and Financial Performance: A Panel Data Analysis," Vikalpa: The Journal for Decision Makers, , vol. 40(4), pages 395-420, December.
    15. Rajan, Bharath & Salunkhe, Uday & Kumar, V., 2023. "Understanding customer engagement in family firms: A conceptual framework," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    16. Ismael Barros-Contreras & Héctor Pérez-Fernández & Natalia Martín-Cruz & Juan Hernangómez B., 2023. "Can we make family social capital flourish? The moderating role of generational involvement," Journal of Family and Economic Issues, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 655-673, September.
    17. Weiping Liu & Haibin Yang & Guangxi Zhang, 2012. "Does family business excel in firm performance? An institution-based view," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 965-987, December.
    18. James J. Chrisman & Jess H. Chua & Allison W. Pearson & Tim Barnett, 2012. "Family Involvement, Family Influence, and Family–Centered Non–Economic Goals in Small Firms," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 36(2), pages 267-293, March.
    19. Francesco Aiello & Lidia Mannarino & Valeria Pupo, 2020. "Innovation and productivity in family firms: evidence from a sample of European firms," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(4), pages 394-416, May.
    20. Khosa,Amrinder & Ahmed,Kamran & Henry,Darren, 2019. "Ownership Structure, Related Party Transactions, and Firm Valuation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108492195, January.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:ijcgvn:v:17:y:2024:i:1:p:63-76. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.